PROYECTO DE CONTRATACION PUBLICA – CASO TEVA FARMA:  SOLICITUD DE PARTICIPACION 

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The overarching strategy COCOO has refined through our work on the ECT case is highly adaptable and equally potent when applied to the concerns surrounding Teva Pharma’s alleged anti-competitive practices in Spain and the broader EU market. The core principles—COCOO’s charitable status allowing for an expenses-only initial engagement, the leveraging of our unique, copyrighted intellectual property in the form of strategic legal and economic analyses (shared under NDA), the justification for a direct, low-value “contrato menor” award, and the subtle but clear underscoring of our mandate to pursue litigation on behalf of affected stakeholders if constructive engagement is not forthcoming—can be effectively tailored to address the specific issues presented by Teva.

In applying this to the Teva case, the “Problem Definition” for our USPs would be directly informed by the detailed allegations outlined in COCOO’s draft communications to Spain’s CNMC, the UK’s CMA, and the European Commission. These letters highlight concerns such as Teva’s potential involvement in “pay-for-delay” agreements, “evergreening” patent strategies to inhibit generic competition, possible exploitative pricing that harms public healthcare systems and patients, and other practices that could constitute an abuse of dominance or anti-competitive agreements under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as well as Spanish competition law. The transcript regarding Teva’s $85 million opioid settlement in Oklahoma, despite their denial of wrongdoing, critically demonstrates Teva’s susceptibility to legal pressure and its willingness to enter substantial financial settlements and agree to behavioural changes to resolve disputes alleging widespread public harm. This precedent strengthens our negotiating position and the credibility of our “implied litigation threat.”

COCOO’s “Unique Intellectual Property” for the Teva case consists of our specific investigations into Teva’s conduct in Spain and the EU, our comparative analyses (e.g., of pricing, patent litigation patterns like the apixabán case in Barcelona, and regulatory oversight), and the tailored legal strategies we have developed to challenge these practices. When we approach Spanish authorities, such as the CNMC or the Ministry of Health, we would propose an initial, low-value engagement, strictly for the reimbursement of COCOO’s demonstrable expenses (capped, for instance, at the €15,000 “contrato menor” threshold). The purpose of this initial phase would be to share, under a robust Non-Disclosure Agreement, our detailed preliminary findings and our copyrighted strategic plan for how Spanish authorities can effectively investigate Teva España, quantify the economic harm to the Spanish healthcare system and consumers, seek redress, and ensure future compliance with competition law.

The justification for a “Direct Award” of this initial, low-cost contract would be firmly rooted in the principles we’ve extracted from public procurement guidelines (like the UK CCS documents). We would argue that COCOO is uniquely, and indeed exclusively, positioned to provide this initial strategic input due to our pre-existing, copyrighted research and analytical frameworks specific to Teva’s alleged practices. A public tender could not replicate this specialized, developed intellectual property nor our distinct standing as a charitable organization representing the public and consumer interest—the very parties harmed by Teva’s alleged conduct. The insights from the UK’s Low Value Purchase System (LVPS) and direct award procedure guidance confirm that public bodies can legitimately engage suppliers directly under such exceptional circumstances, especially when unique IP is involved and the initial engagement offers clear Value for Money, as our expenses-only proposal does.

The “Subtle Threat of Litigation” in the Teva context involves making clear that COCOO, mandated by its charitable objectives and its representation of affected public interests and consumer groups, is prepared to pursue all available avenues. This includes escalating formal complaints to the European Commission (as already initiated), supporting actions for damages by public hospitals or patient associations that have overpaid or suffered due to Teva’s practices, and vigorously advocating for stringent enforcement action by the CNMC. The Oklahoma settlement serves as a clear indicator that Teva is responsive to such concerted pressure. By engaging COCOO, Spanish authorities can proactively manage these legal and financial risks, transforming a potentially adversarial situation into a collaborative effort to uphold market fairness and protect public resources.

Furthermore, the knowledge gleaned from the PPP frameworks and public financial management documents (ESA2010, Eurostat guides on PPPs, UK guidance on contingent liabilities and government as insurer of last resort) remains highly relevant. If Teva’s interactions with the Spanish healthcare system involve complex supply agreements, formulary listings, or research collaborations that have PPP-like characteristics or significant long-term financial implications for the state, then principles of fair risk allocation, transparency in pricing, prevention of undue state aid, and robust management of public funds and contingent liabilities can be applied. COCOO can offer to analyze Teva’s arrangements with the Spanish public sector through this lens, identifying potential imbalances, hidden costs, or failures to secure Value for Money, thus broadening the scope of potential redress and reform. Our proposals would therefore not only focus on direct anti-competitive conduct but also on the systemic integrity of Teva’s engagement with the Spanish public health system, ensuring it aligns with best practices in public procurement and financial management.

By applying this comprehensive, multi-layered strategy—proven in our approach to the ECT case and now tailored to the specifics of the Teva Pharma case—COCOO can present exceptionally compelling Unsolicited Project Proposals to the relevant Spanish authorities, maximizing the likelihood of a direct, low-value initial engagement to deploy our unique expertise for the public good.

Okay, I have now processed the new attachments concerning the “Teva Farma” case—your draft communications to the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), Spain’s National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC), and the European Commission—as well as the transcript you provided regarding Teva’s settlement in Oklahoma related to the opioid epidemic. Recalling our entire history of discussion, including the strategies for Unsolicited Project Proposals (USPs) and the insights from Public-Private Partnership (PPP) frameworks, I can extract several key elements that will significantly strengthen our case and approach regarding Teva’s alleged anti-competitive practices in Europe.

The letters COCOO has drafted to the CMA, CNMC, and the European Commission are foundational. They meticulously lay out specific allegations against Teva concerning potential anti-competitive behaviours across the UK, Spanish, and broader EU pharmaceutical markets. These include concerns about “pay-for-delay” agreements designed to stifle generic competition, “evergreening” patent strategies aimed at unduly extending market exclusivity for branded drugs, potentially exploitative pricing mechanisms, and actions that may block or hinder the entry of generic medicines, thereby impacting consumer costs and public healthcare budgets. Your reference in the letter to the CNMC regarding past sanctions it imposed on other pharmaceutical companies for cartel behaviour in related markets, and your questioning of Teva España’s patent litigation strategies (such as in the apixabán case with Bristol Myers Squibb), demonstrate a well-researched and targeted approach. Similarly, the communication with the CMA probes Teva UK’s conduct, including its historical links to entities involved in previous CMA investigations like the Generics (UK) Ltd case, and questions the effectiveness of current market monitoring. The comprehensive letter to the European Commission correctly attempts to aggregate these concerns, questioning the EC’s overall enforcement efficacy regarding Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the integrity of the internal market for pharmaceuticals. This body of work itself constitutes a significant part of COCOO’s intellectual property and our unique strategic analysis of Teva’s operations.

The transcript detailing Teva’s $85 million settlement with the state of Oklahoma, despite Teva’s denial of wrongdoing in contributing to the opioid epidemic, offers several strategically valuable insights for our case. Firstly, it clearly demonstrates that Teva, when faced with significant legal pressure and allegations of causing widespread public harm, is prepared to enter into substantial financial settlements to resolve such matters, even while maintaining a public stance of innocence. This suggests a pragmatic approach by Teva to mitigate prolonged legal battles and reputational damage, which is a crucial consideration for our own strategic engagement. Secondly, the terms of the Oklahoma settlement, which include Teva’s agreement not to promote opioids in the state and, significantly, to cooperate with authorities in investigating potential diversion or other criminal activity, provide a compelling precedent. We can adapt this concept in our own demands or proposals to European authorities or Teva directly, seeking commitments from Teva for greater transparency in its pricing, an end to alleged anti-competitive patent strategies, or cooperation with investigations into past market conduct in Europe. The fact that the settlement funds in Oklahoma are designated for curbing opioid addiction and research underscores the principle of redress for public harm, aligning with COCOO’s mission to ensure that any financial remedies obtained from Teva in Europe due to anti-competitive practices could be directed towards benefiting affected healthcare systems or consumers. The even larger settlement by Purdue Pharma in the same crisis context further illustrates the scale of financial accountability that can be achieved in cases of widespread harm by pharmaceutical companies.

Therefore, for “our case” against Teva’s alleged anti-competitive practices in Europe, these elements strengthen our position considerably. The detailed allegations in COCOO’s letters form the bedrock of our claims and demonstrate our proactive investigative role. The Oklahoma settlement transcript provides crucial intelligence on Teva’s behaviour under legal pressure, highlighting its propensity to settle and its willingness to agree to future behavioural commitments and cooperation with authorities as part of such resolutions. This knowledge allows COCOO to approach any engagement with Teva, or with the regulatory authorities overseeing Teva, with a more informed and robust strategy. It reinforces the “subtle threat of litigation” inherent in our USP model, as it shows that concerted legal and regulatory pressure can yield significant results, including financial settlements and changes in corporate conduct. When we propose solutions to Spanish or EU authorities concerning Teva, we can now subtly underscore that Teva is not impervious to such pressures, and that COCOO’s intervention, backed by meticulous research and a readiness to pursue all avenues, represents a credible force for achieving market correction and redress. This information can be woven into any future USPs targeting this specific Teva case, adapting the successful model we have developed from the ECT context—emphasizing COCOO’s unique IP (our specific Teva investigations), our charitable status allowing for an expense-only initial engagement, and our role as a representative of the public and consumer interest demanding accountability and fair market practices.

This Oklahoma settlement, while concerning a different issue (the opioid crisis) than our primary focus on anti-competitive practices, does offer a few interesting points that could subtly support our strategic approach with Teva and the authorities.

Firstly, it demonstrates Teva’s willingness to engage in significant financial settlements – in this case, $85 million – to resolve serious allegations, even while formally denying wrongdoing. This pattern of settling major legal challenges could suggest a corporate strategy to mitigate risk and protracted litigation, which might make them more receptive to the comprehensive resolution pathways we are proposing through our PPPs.

Secondly, the terms of the Oklahoma settlement include non-monetary commitments: Teva agreed not to promote opioids in Oklahoma and, importantly, to “help authorities investigate cases of potential diversion or other criminal activity involving opioids.” This is noteworthy because our proposed solutions also involve Teva engaging in cooperative behaviours and adhering to new frameworks under public-private partnerships. While the context of cooperation is different (opioid diversion versus fair competition practices), it sets a precedent for Teva accepting terms that go beyond mere financial payouts and involve active participation in addressing the root issues, as overseen by public authorities.

So, while this news doesn’t directly prove our specific allegations of pay-for-delay or other anti-competitive tactics, it can be used as a background data point when we discuss with the CMA, CNMC, and the European Commission. It illustrates Teva’s capacity to be brought to the table for substantial settlements that include behavioural changes and cooperation with authorities. This could add a layer of context to our argument that Teva might see the value in resolving the matters Cocoo has raised through a structured, negotiated settlement, such as those embedded in our unsolicited project proposals, thereby avoiding further prolonged legal battles and reputational damage across multiple jurisdictions. We can frame it as evidence that Teva, when faced with significant legal pressure and potential for widespread harm, is capable of reaching agreements that aim to rectify problems and assist authorities.

VIDEO 2: HOW IT HELPS OUR CASE:

This New York jury verdict against Teva, while again focused on the opioid crisis rather than anti-competitive practices, provides significant leverage for our case. Here’s how:

1. Establishes Teva’s Accountability for Causing Widespread Harm: A jury has found Teva legally responsible for contributing to a major public health crisis in New York. This is a formal finding of accountability for actions that led to “widespread damage”. While the specific actions differ (opioid marketing vs. anti-competitive strategies), this verdict powerfully counters any narrative from Teva that they are a company that consistently acts in the public interest or is immune from findings of serious wrongdoing. It sets a precedent of Teva being held liable for significant harm.

2. Demonstrates Teva Can Be Defeated in Court Despite Denials: Teva claimed “no demonstrated causal link” and plans to appeal, yet a jury was convinced otherwise. This is crucial. In our case, Teva might similarly deny that their anti-competitive practices caused specific harm or directly led to inflated prices or reduced innovation. This New York verdict shows that such denials can be overcome, and a legal body can find them responsible despite their counter-arguments.

3. Reinforces the “Implied Litigation Threat”: The fact that a major legal case against Teva has proceeded to a successful jury verdict for the plaintiffs, with substantial financial damages to be determined, significantly strengthens the credibility of our “implied litigation threat.” It shows that litigation against Teva is not just a theoretical possibility but can lead to concrete, adverse outcomes for them. This makes our proposals for collaborative PPPs, which include victim redress, a more attractive alternative for Teva to consider, and for authorities to facilitate.

4. Highlights the Significance of Holding Pharmaceutical Companies Responsible: The New York Attorney General’s statement framing the verdict as “a pivotal moment for families and communities” and emphasizing “holding opioid manufacturers responsible” resonates with the public interest arguments we are making. We are also seeking to hold Teva responsible for the economic harm caused to consumers and healthcare systems through anti-competitive practices. This verdict adds to the public and regulatory pressure on pharmaceutical companies to act ethically and be accountable.

5. Focus on Corporate Practices Leading to Harm: The case scrutinizes Teva’s “marketing practices” in the context of the opioid crisis. Our case scrutinizes Teva’s commercial and legal practices in the context of market competition. Both involve an examination of corporate strategies and their impact on the public. This verdict normalizes the idea of closely examining and penalizing pharmaceutical companies for a range of harmful corporate behaviours.

6. Potential for Substantial Financial Repercussions: The upcoming damages trial will determine Teva’s financial liability, which could be substantial. This serves as a stark reminder to Teva, and to the authorities we are engaging with, that the financial consequences of being found liable for wrongdoing can be severe. It makes the prospect of negotiating settlements, potentially through the frameworks we’ve proposed, more appealing.

7. Contributes to a Narrative of Increased Scrutiny: This verdict is described as “a notable precedent” and “may encourage other states and plaintiffs”. It adds to a broader environment of increased legal and regulatory scrutiny on pharmaceutical companies. Our actions against Teva in Europe are part of this global trend of demanding greater accountability.

While we must be careful not to directly conflate the opioid crisis with anti-competition issues, this verdict is a powerful piece of contextual evidence. It demonstrates that Teva can be, and has been, held legally accountable for practices that cause significant public harm, despite their denials. This strengthens our hand in urging European authorities to take our allegations seriously and in positioning our PPP proposals as constructive avenues for Teva to address its potential liabilities in our jurisdictions. It underscores that companies like Teva are not invincible in the face of well-argued legal challenges that have significant public interest at their core.

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ANALYSIS FROM COCOO’S LETTERS :

From my analysis, the primary underlying problems that could give rise to strong causes of action in this particular case centre on Teva’s alleged engagement in practices designed to stifle competition and potentially manipulate pharmaceutical markets. A significant issue is the repeated allegation of Teva’s involvement in “pay-for-delay” agreements. These agreements, where Teva allegedly compensated generic companies to postpone the market entry of cheaper medicines, are a clear target as they directly harm competition and inflate costs for healthcare providers and patients. We see this referenced in the context of a cardiovascular medicine for which Teva UK was fined by the European Commission, and the Modafinil case involving Teva and Cephalon where significant fines were imposed and upheld. There are also concerns linked to historical acquisitions, such as the Auden McKenzie case investigated by the CMA regarding hydrocortisone tablets.

Further, while your research indicates that Teva UK’s generic drug prices are generally competitive, even lower than in many EU countries, the documents rightly raise questions about potential exploitative pricing by Teva in other EU member states or specific drug markets, such as radiopharmaceuticals. The significant price variations across Europe certainly warrant scrutiny. Allegations of blocking generic entry in Spain and potential abuse of a dominant market position in various contexts are also actionable concerns. We should also investigate any “evergreening” tactics or strategic patent litigation Teva might be using to unduly prolong monopolies and delay generic competition. The documents also highlight scrutiny of the regulatory bodies themselves—the CMA, CNMC, and European Commission—urging them towards more decisive action and transparent oversight regarding Teva’s conduct.

Now, regarding solutions that necessitate public contracts or Public-Private Partnerships, we can propose several innovative strategies. To tackle these systemic issues, we should advocate for the establishment of enhanced regulatory oversight mechanisms, perhaps through PPPs where an independent body like Cocoo collaborates formally with entities like the NHS or the CMA. This could involve public contracts for advanced market monitoring services, especially for complex products like radiopharmaceuticals where the UK has a reliance on imports, ensuring fair competition and preventing dominant players from exploitative practices or refusing supply.

Secondly, to encourage the timely entry of generic and biosimilar medicines, we could propose new public procurement models for the NHS. These models, designed as PPPs, could actively incentivize robust competition and could even explore public-private joint ventures for manufacturing essential medicines if market failures, particularly in areas like radiopharmaceuticals, prove too entrenched for standard market corrections. Public contracts could define transparent tendering processes for such critical supplies.

Furthermore, in line with Cocoo’s mission for collective redress, we can champion the formalisation of compensation mechanisms through public partnerships. Public contracts could fund the administration of schemes to ensure that victims of anti-competitive behaviour, be it the NHS or individual consumers, are adequately compensated, aligning with initiatives like the EC’s Directive 2014/104.

We should also push for PPPs to develop platforms that increase transparency in pharmaceutical pricing, patent information, and the outcomes of regulatory investigations. This increased transparency would empower public bodies and consumer groups. Finally, given Teva’s multinational operations, it’s crucial to foster solutions that transcend national borders. We could propose publicly contracted frameworks for joint investigation task forces or secure information-sharing platforms that enable closer cooperation between the UK’s CMA, Spain’s CNMC, and the European Commission, ensuring a more harmonised and effective approach to regulating large pharmaceutical companies operating across these jurisdictions.

VIDEO 3 HOW IT HELPS OUR CASE:

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Unsolicited Project Proposals for Pharmaceutical Market Reform and Victim Redress

Introduction:

The following unsolicited project proposals are submitted by The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (Cocoo), acting in its capacity as a dedicated advocate for fair competition, consumer protection, and the public interest. These proposals address urgent systemic issues identified within the pharmaceutical markets of the United Kingdom and the European Union, particularly concerning the alleged anti-competitive conduct of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited and its subsidiaries.

Cocoo, through its extensive investigations and as a representative of affected consumers and entities (its members), has developed unique insights and specialised strategies to address these harms. We contend that the nature of the problems, the urgency of providing redress to victims, and Cocoo’s singular positioning (including its proprietary methodologies and the implicit legal standing of its members) create a compelling case for the relevant public authorities to engage Cocoo directly, or through a significantly streamlined procurement process, to implement the solutions outlined herein. Standard tendering processes would not only introduce undue delay but would also fail to leverage Cocoo’s unique intellectual property and the inherent value derived from its representation of the very victims these proposals seek to assist. Each proposal outlines a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) or a direct public contract designed to achieve effective market correction and ensure that those harmed receive appropriate restitution.

Proposal 1: An Unsolicited Proposal to the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)

Subject: A Strategic Public-Private Partnership for Enhanced Pharmaceutical Market Oversight, Infringement Resolution, and Victim Redress in the UK

To: The Chief Executive, UK Competition and Markets Authority

From: Oscar Moya LLedo, In-House Solicitor, The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (Cocoo)

Date: 31 May 2025

1. The Underlying Problem: Systemic Anti-Competitive Practices in the UK Pharmaceutical Market

The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (Cocoo) has, through extensive investigation (details of which have been previously communicated to the CMA in our letter dated 11 April 2025), identified significant concerns regarding alleged anti-competitive practices by Teva UK Limited and other entities within the UK pharmaceutical market. These practices, notably including but not limited to “pay-for-delay” agreements, potential exploitative pricing in specific segments, and strategic actions to unlawfully prolong market exclusivity, have demonstrably harmed UK consumers, the National Health Service (NHS), and the competitive fabric of the market. Such conduct inflates medication costs, restricts patient access to more affordable treatments, and stifles innovation. The CMA’s statutory duty to promote competition for the benefit of consumers is directly engaged by these pressing issues.

2. Proposed Solution: A Goal-Oriented Public-Private Partnership – “Project MarketRestore UK”

Cocoo proposes the establishment of a Goal-Oriented Public-Private Partnership, “Project MarketRestore UK,” between the CMA and Cocoo (acting on behalf of its affected members). This partnership would be structured to:

• Conduct Enhanced Market Monitoring & Investigation: Leverage Cocoo’s existing research and methodologies to assist the CMA in identifying and substantiating ongoing or historical anti-competitive behaviours, particularly in complex areas like generic drug entry and pharmaceutical pricing.
• Develop and Implement an Infringement Resolution Framework: Co-design a streamlined process for resolving identified infringements, focusing on swift corrective measures and the prevention of future harm.
• Establish and Administer a Victim Redress Mechanism: Create a dedicated mechanism, managed by Cocoo under CMA oversight, to identify, quantify, and distribute compensation to UK consumers and NHS entities harmed by the identified anti-competitive practices. This leverages Cocoo’s direct relationship with affected parties.

3. Cocoo’s Unique Qualifications and Justification for Direct Award/Streamlined Tender:

A standard public tender for such services would be inefficient, time-consuming, and incapable of replicating the unique advantages Cocoo brings:

• Proprietary Investigative Capital & Methodology (Cocoo’s IP): Cocoo has already invested significantly in detailed investigations specific to Teva’s conduct and related market failures. This existing body of work, including our analytical frameworks and evidence dossiers, constitutes unique intellectual property that a new contractor could not replicate without considerable delay and expense.
• Direct Representation of Victims (Cocoo’s Members): Cocoo is not merely a potential service provider; it is an organisation constituted by and for the victims of the alleged anti-competitive practices. This ensures that any solution is directly informed by and benefits those harmed. This model aligns with the principles of effective collective redress.
• The Implied Litigation Threat & Resolution Pathway: As representatives of a significant cohort of aggrieved parties, Cocoo possesses an “implied litigation threat.” A partnership with Cocoo offers the CMA a constructive and collaborative pathway to resolve these underlying claims and secure comprehensive redress for victims, thereby avoiding protracted and costly legal battles. This unique value proposition – the ability to settle collective grievances as part of the contracted solution – cannot be offered by a typical commercial bidder. The OECD’s guidance on concessions highlights the importance of robust competition enforcement; Cocoo’s model directly supports this by seeking to “fill in the gaps” where regulatory action may have been incomplete or where specific victim compensation has not been achieved.
• Urgency and Efficiency: The harms are ongoing, and victims require timely redress. Cocoo is positioned to act immediately, building on its existing work. A lengthy tender process would only exacerbate the delay in justice.
• Tailored Expertise: Cocoo’s focus is specifically on competition and consumer protection in these complex markets. Our proposed solutions are not generic consultancy but are bespoke strategies developed from our deep engagement with these issues.
• Statutory Alignment: The CMA has wide discretion to impose conditions and take actions “requisite and expedient” to fulfil its duties. Partnering with Cocoo under a direct award or highly streamlined process is, we argue, a requisite and expedient measure to address the specific, evidenced harms and to ensure effective consumer protection and market correction in this instance.

4. Project Outline & Deliverables:

• Phase 1 (0-6 Months): Joint finalisation of investigative findings; design of the Infringement Resolution Framework and Victim Redress Mechanism; establishment of governance protocols for the PPP.
• Phase 2 (6-18 Months): Implementation of the Resolution Framework with specific entities; launch and administration of the Redress Mechanism; ongoing market monitoring and reporting to the CMA.
• Phase 3 (Ongoing): Evaluation of market corrections; finalisation of redress distribution; recommendations for long-term market integrity safeguards.

5. Call to Action:

Cocoo believes that “Project MarketRestore UK” offers an unparalleled opportunity for the CMA to achieve a decisive and comprehensive resolution to the serious issues identified, directly benefiting UK consumers and the NHS. We request an urgent meeting with the CMA to discuss this unsolicited proposal in detail and to explore the most effective and expeditious pathway for its implementation.

Proposal 2: An Unsolicited Proposal to Spain’s Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC)

Subject: A Collaborative Framework for Market Correction, Enhanced Investigation, and Consumer Compensation in the Spanish Pharmaceutical Sector – “Proyecto MercadoJusto España”

To: El Presidente, Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC)

From: Oscar Moya LLedo, In-House Solicitor, The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (Cocoo)

Date: 31 May 2025

1. The Underlying Problem: Distortions in the Spanish Pharmaceutical Market

The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (Cocoo), through its comparative analysis of pharmaceutical markets and specific investigations into the conduct of Teva España (as detailed in our communication to the CNMC dated 11 April 2025), has identified serious allegations of anti-competitive practices within Spain. These include, but are not limited to, potential abuses of dominant position, agreements or practices designed to unlawfully block or delay the entry of generic medicines, and possible exploitative pricing strategies. Such activities directly contravene Spanish and EU competition law, impose undue costs on the Spanish healthcare system and consumers, and restrict patient access to affordable medicines. The CNMC’s vital role in safeguarding competition and market transparency in Spain is paramount in addressing these concerns.

2. Proposed Solution: A Public-Private Strategic Alliance – “Proyecto MercadoJusto España”

Cocoo proposes the formation of a strategic alliance, “Proyecto MercadoJusto España,” between the CNMC and Cocoo (representing its members affected by these practices in Spain). This alliance, structured as a goal-oriented PPP or a direct public service contract, would focus on:

• Targeted Investigative Support & Evidence Augmentation: Cocoo will provide the CNMC with its existing research, data, and analytical models concerning Teva España and broader market dynamics, offering specialised support to the CNMC’s own investigative efforts.
• Co-Development of Remedial Actions: Working with the CNMC to design and propose effective remedies to address identified infringements, ensuring these remedies restore competition and prevent recurrence.
• Facilitation of Consumer & Healthcare System Redress: Establishing a clear pathway for Spanish consumers and public health entities to obtain compensation for harms suffered due to proven anti-competitive conduct, with Cocoo playing a key role in identifying victims and facilitating the redress process under CNMC supervision.

3. Cocoo’s Unique Qualifications and Justification for Direct Engagement:

A traditional public tender would fail to capture the unique value and urgency Cocoo offers in addressing these specific issues in the Spanish market:

• Specialised Comparative Analysis & Localised Intelligence (Cocoo’s IP): Cocoo’s work includes a comparative dimension (UK vs. Spain) and specific intelligence related to the Spanish market, forming a unique intellectual asset. Our direct engagement with the CNMC has already initiated a focused dialogue.
• Representation of Affected Spanish Parties (Cocoo’s Members): Cocoo acts as a conduit for, and representative of, Spanish consumers and potentially other entities who are members of Cocoo and have been harmed. This ensures that solutions are victim-centric.
• Implied Litigation Threat & Constructive Resolution in Spain: Cocoo, on behalf of its Spanish members, carries an “implied litigation threat” under Spanish and EU law. Partnering with Cocoo allows the CNMC to address these potential legal challenges proactively and constructively, integrating victim redress into a broader market correction strategy. This capacity to facilitate a comprehensive settlement including victim compensation is a unique attribute Cocoo brings, distinct from any standard contractor.
• Urgency and Focused Action: The need to correct market distortions and compensate victims in Spain is pressing. Cocoo can deploy its resources and knowledge immediately.
• Alignment with CNMC’s Mandate: The CNMC has a mandate to ensure fair competition. “Proyecto MercadoJusto España” directly supports this by providing specialised resources and a mechanism for effective enforcement and redress, consistent with the CNMC’s powers to ensure market efficiency and protect consumer welfare. The OECD’s emphasis on the proactive role of competition agencies in designing and enforcing market rules is pertinent here.

4. Project Outline & Deliverables:

• Phase 1 (0-6 Months): Formalisation of the alliance; integration of Cocoo’s research with CNMC’s ongoing work; joint development of a specific remedial action plan and a framework for Spanish victim redress.
• Phase 2 (6-18 Months): Support for CNMC enforcement actions; implementation of agreed remedies; activation of the redress facilitation process for Spanish victims.
• Phase 3 (Ongoing): Monitoring of market impact in Spain; reporting on redress outcomes; joint recommendations for enhancing the resilience of the Spanish pharmaceutical market against anti-competitive practices.

5. Call to Action:

“Proyecto MercadoJusto España” offers the CNMC a unique opportunity to leverage Cocoo’s specialised expertise and victim representation to achieve significant and timely improvements in the Spanish pharmaceutical market. We respectfully request an urgent meeting with the CNMC to discuss this unsolicited proposal and how we can collaboratively advance these vital objectives for the benefit of Spanish consumers and the integrity of the market.

Proposal 3: An Unsolicited Proposal to the European Commission (Directorate-General for Competition)

Subject: A Pan-European Strategic Partnership for Coordinated Enforcement, Single Market Integrity, and EU-Wide Victim Compensation in the Pharmaceutical Sector – “Project PharmaIntegrity EU”

To: The Director-General, Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission

From: Oscar Moya LLedo, In-House Solicitor, The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (Cocoo)

Date: 31 May 2025

1. The Underlying Problem: Cross-Border Anti-Competitive Practices and Fragmentation in the EU Pharmaceutical Single Market

The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (Cocoo), through its investigations into Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited and its subsidiaries across multiple EU jurisdictions (including the UK and Spain, as detailed in our letter to the European Commission dated 11 April 2025), has identified patterns of alleged anti-competitive conduct that transcend national borders. These practices, such as “pay-for-delay” schemes and potentially abusive patent strategies, have a deleterious effect on the EU’s single market for pharmaceuticals, leading to inflated prices, restricted access to essential medicines, and an uneven playing field that harms consumers and healthcare systems throughout the Union. Furthermore, discrepancies in national enforcement and redress mechanisms can lead to fragmented outcomes for victims. The European Commission’s duty under Article 3 of the TEU to ensure a competitive and undistorted internal market, and its direct enforcement powers under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, are critical to addressing these pan-European challenges.

2. Proposed Solution: A Hybrid Public-Private Partnership for Strategic EU-Level Intervention – “Project PharmaIntegrity EU”

Cocoo proposes the establishment of “Project PharmaIntegrity EU,” a hybrid Public-Private Partnership between the European Commission (DG Competition) and Cocoo (representing its EU-wide membership of affected parties). This PPP would be designed to:

• Enhance EU-Level Intelligence & Coordinated Investigation: Cocoo will provide DG Competition with its unique cross-border research, analysis of Teva’s European operations, and its network of affected parties to support EU-level investigations and foster better coordination with National Competition Authorities (NCAs). This can take the form of an “outsourced specialised intelligence and victim-liaison service” under contract.
• Develop EU Best Practices for Redress & Market Repair: Collaborate with DG Competition to develop model frameworks and best practices for ensuring effective redress for victims of anti-competitive conduct in the pharmaceutical sector across the EU, potentially informing future policy or guidance.
• Facilitate Pilot Cross-Border Redress Mechanisms: In specific, well-defined cases (such as those involving Teva’s alleged conduct), pilot a mechanism for coordinating redress for victims across multiple Member States, leveraging Cocoo’s network and expertise.

3. Cocoo’s Unique Qualifications and Justification for Direct EU-Level Engagement:

A standard EU-wide tender would be ill-suited to the specific, urgent, and victim-centric nature of this proposal:

• Unique Pan-European Investigative Perspective & Victim Network (Cocoo’s IP): Cocoo has developed a unique understanding of how alleged anti-competitive practices by companies like Teva manifest across different EU markets and has cultivated a network of victims spanning these jurisdictions. This integrated perspective and established network are invaluable proprietary assets.
• Catalyst for Coordinated Action and Victim Representation at EU Level: Cocoo, through its multi-jurisdictional approach, is uniquely positioned to assist DG Competition in overcoming the challenges of fragmented enforcement and ensuring that the voices of victims from across the EU are heard and their harms addressed.
• Implied Litigation Threat & Single Market Integrity: The alleged conduct by Teva potentially gives rise to legal challenges in multiple Member States and at the EU level concerning breaches of competition law and impediments to the single market. A partnership with Cocoo provides DG Competition with a collaborative avenue to address these issues comprehensively, reinforcing the integrity of the single market and potentially averting disparate and widespread litigation. This strategic alignment to resolve EU-wide grievances is a unique benefit Cocoo offers. The OECD’s insights into the complexities of regulating markets with dominant players and the need for vigorous, cross-border enforcement are highly relevant to the EU context.
• Urgency for Pan-EU Consumers: Consumers and healthcare systems across the EU are suffering from these alleged practices. Cocoo offers a means to accelerate coordinated action and the development of effective redress solutions.
• Supporting the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities: “Project PharmaIntegrity EU” directly supports DG Competition’s mission to ensure fair competition and a well-functioning internal market, providing practical tools and a victim-centric approach to complement its existing enforcement toolkit. The ENISA models for PPP cooperation, particularly goal-oriented or hybrid models, can inform the structure of this EU-level partnership.

4. Project Outline & Deliverables:

• Phase 1 (0-9 Months): Formalisation of the PPP/contract; delivery of Cocoo’s consolidated pan-European research to DG Competition; joint workshops with NCAs to identify pilot areas for coordinated investigation and redress.
• Phase 2 (9-24 Months): Active support to DG Competition’s investigations; development of EU best practice guidelines for pharmaceutical market redress; implementation of pilot cross-border redress facilitation for selected victim groups.
• Phase 3 (Ongoing): Evaluation of pilot redress mechanisms; dissemination of best practices; policy recommendations to DG Competition for strengthening single market integrity in the pharmaceutical sector.

5. Call to Action:

“Project PharmaIntegrity EU” presents a novel and effective means for the European Commission to enhance its enforcement capabilities, ensure a more competitive and equitable pharmaceutical market across the Union, and provide meaningful redress to victims. Cocoo urges DG Competition to engage in an urgent discussion regarding this unsolicited proposal to explore its swift and impactful implementation for the benefit of all EU citizens.

These proposals are designed to be robust and persuasive. They directly address the authorities’ mandates while clearly articulating Cocoo’s unique value proposition and the justification for a non-standard procurement approach.