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CASEFILES >> COAS & FOIS

Possible causes of action include direct financial harm to public funds, failure of regulatory oversight, compromise of public health objectives, and joint responsibility scenarios involving private companies and public systems. Direct financial harm targets national health services like the UK’s NHS and Spain’s SNS, which overpaid for medicines due to Teva’s anti-competitive practices, such as pay-for-delay agreements, patent misuse, and exploitative pricing. This is actionable under EU Directive 2014/104/EU, which enables damages claims for antitrust violations, covering drugs like Copaxone, Modafinil, hydrocortisone, and potentially radiopharmaceuticals. Evidence includes procurement data showing inflated costs and regulatory findings confirming illegality. Failure of regulatory oversight implicates the CMA, CNMC, and European Commission for potentially inadequate enforcement, allowing Teva’s practices to persist. This could support administrative challenges or advocacy for systemic reform, as COCOO’s letters question regulatory effectiveness. Compromise of public health objectives arises from Teva’s actions restricting access to affordable generics, undermining government healthcare goals, actionable through public interest litigation or regulatory pressure. Joint responsibility scenarios include manipulation of public procurement, as seen in the 18-FDG radiopharmaceutical cartel involving Advanced Accelerator Applications Ibérica and Curium Pharma Spain, exploiting tender processes. Teva’s alleged patent litigation strategies, such as the apixabán case, may also constitute abuse of publicly granted monopoly rights, implicating both Teva and patent authorities. Additionally, Teva’s disparagement campaign against rival products, as found in the Copaxone case, supports claims for misleading practices under competition law.

Findings of infringement related to this case include several regulatory and judicial decisions. The European Commission’s 2014 ruling in the Servier case fined Teva UK Limited 15.57 million euros for a pay-for-delay agreement concerning a cardiovascular medicine, violating Article 101 TFEU. The 2020 Teva/Cephalon case, upheld by the EU General Court in October 2023, imposed a 60.5 million euro fine for a pay-for-delay agreement delaying Modafinil’s generic entry, also breaching Article 101 TFEU. The Commission’s Copaxone ruling (Case AT.39686) found Teva guilty of abusing its dominant position under Article 102 TFEU by using a “divisional game” to extend patent protection and disparaging rival products, delaying generic competition for nine years until 2024. In the UK, the CMA’s investigation into Auden McKenzie (acquired by Teva) provisionally found a pay-for-delay agreement for hydrocortisone tablets, breaching UK competition law, with ongoing proceedings as of the latest documents. In Spain, the CNMC’s investigation into Advanced Accelerator Applications Ibérica and Curium Pharma Spain confirmed a cartel in the 18-FDG radiopharmaceutical market, involving market sharing and customer allocation, though Teva España was not directly named. A complaint by the Servicio Andaluz de Salud to the CNMC against Teva España for unspecified anti-competitive practices suggests scrutiny, but no formal infringement finding is detailed. The apixabán patent litigation in Spain, where the Barcelona Provincial Court prohibited Teva Pharma from selling a generic version, raises concerns about strategic patent use, though not yet confirmed as anti-competitive by the CNMC.

New insights from the documents strengthen COCOO’s strategic position. The comparative analysis of Teva UK’s competitive pricing versus potential issues in Spain highlights market-specific variations, suggesting a targeted approach to Spanish claims where pricing or patent strategies may be less defensible. The CNMC’s dismissal of Teva España’s predatory pricing complaint against AstraZeneca indicates Teva’s familiarity with competition law processes, which could complicate negotiations but also signals their vulnerability to regulatory scrutiny. The absence of a confirmed 2020 CMA investigation into Teva’s collusion, combined with the European Commission’s lack of clarity on a similar probe, suggests potential regulatory gaps that COCOO can exploit by positioning itself as a catalyst for coordinated action. The documents’ emphasis on the UK’s competitive generic market, driven by regulatory incentives, contrasts with Spain’s less transparent market, offering a narrative to pressure Spanish authorities for reform. The Copaxone case’s cross-border impact across seven EU states underscores the need for a pan-European strategy, aligning with COCOO’s proposed “Project PharmaIntegrity EU.” The regulatory focus on radiopharmaceuticals, as seen in the CNMC’s 18-FDG cartel case, opens a new avenue for investigating Teva’s role in this niche market, potentially uncovering additional infringements.

To monetize the case as COCOO’s solicitor, I would pursue a multi-faceted strategy leveraging litigation, mediation, and public contracts. First, I would initiate follow-on damages claims under Directive 2014/104/EU on behalf of the NHS, SNS, and other affected parties, such as private insurers or patient groups, targeting overcharges from Copaxone, Modafinil, and hydrocortisone. Using a “no-win, no-fee” model, COCOO would partner with litigation funders like Fortress Investment Group, securing funding for legal and economic expert costs in exchange for a percentage of recovered damages, potentially worth millions given the scale of public health budgets. Second, I would propose a mediation framework, as outlined in the Unsolicited Mediation Proposal, to Teva and regulators, leveraging the threat of mass arbitration to compel a settlement. This would involve negotiating a financial redress fund and future compliance commitments, with COCOO earning a management fee (e.g., 10-20% of the settlement) for facilitating the process. Third, I would submit Unsolicited Project Proposals, such as “Proyecto MercadoJusto España” (capped at 15,000 euros) and “Project MarketRestore UK” (9,800 pounds), to the CNMC and CMA for low-value scoping studies, using COCOO’s proprietary research to secure direct awards. These contracts, reimbursed as operational expenses, would establish COCOO as a trusted partner, opening doors to larger contracts for market monitoring or redress administration. Additionally, I would bid on relevant tenders, such as the EU’s “Study on the Obstacles to the Uptake of Biosimilar Medicines” (deadline July 19, 2024), partnering with economic consultancies to enhance credibility, with fees covering research and advocacy costs. Finally, a media campaign using #MediatePharma would drive claimant recruitment, increasing the claimant pool and strengthening COCOO’s leverage, with donations from supporters funding operational costs. This combined approach ensures multiple revenue streams—litigation proceeds, mediation fees, contract awards, and donations—while advancing the case and COCOO’s mission.

COCOO.UK WEBPAGES

New insights from the provided text reveal a sophisticated strategic framework that COCOO can leverage to maximize the impact of its case against Teva. The text underscores the importance of framing Teva’s alleged anti-competitive practices within a broader narrative of systemic pharmaceutical industry misconduct, which not only strengthens the public interest dimension but also amplifies pressure on regulators and Teva itself. The European Commission’s definitive finding against Teva for abusing its dominant position with Copaxone provides a legally binding precedent that significantly reduces the burden of proof in follow-on claims, making the case economically viable and legally robust. The Oklahoma settlement and New York jury verdict against Teva, though related to the opioid crisis, demonstrate Teva’s vulnerability to concerted legal pressure and its willingness to settle significant claims, suggesting that a well-orchestrated mediation or litigation strategy could yield substantial financial redress and behavioral commitments. The concept of “innovation lifecycle” harm, drawn from the innovation transcript, offers a novel angle to argue that Teva’s practices stifle not just competition but the societal benefits of affordable generic medicines, aligning the case with broader public health objectives. The identification of a “victim compensation gap” in regulatory frameworks highlights an opportunity for COCOO to position itself as an essential partner to regulators, offering a mediation framework that addresses this gap while avoiding the inefficiencies of mass litigation. Finally, the detailed procurement strategies, particularly the use of Spain’s “contrato menor” and the UK’s low-value purchase systems, provide a practical pathway to secure direct engagements with public bodies, leveraging COCOO’s unique intellectual property to bypass lengthy tender processes.

Findings of infringement that allow for follow-on claims include several key regulatory decisions. The European Commission’s ruling on Teva’s Copaxone case (Case AT.39686) found Teva guilty of abusing its dominant market position by employing a “divisional game” to extend patent protection and running a disparagement campaign against rival products, delaying generic competition for nine years until 2024. This decision, impacting seven EU member states, establishes a clear violation of Article 102 TFEU, enabling follow-on damages claims for affected parties such as national health services and consumers. Another significant finding is the European Commission’s fine of 15.57 million euros against Teva UK Limited in 2014 for participating in a pay-for-delay agreement related to a cardiovascular medicine (Servier case), breaching Article 101 TFEU. Additionally, the Commission’s ruling against Teva and Cephalon for a pay-for-delay agreement delaying the entry of a generic version of Modafinil, upheld by the EU General Court in October 2023, provides another basis for follow-on claims under Article 101 TFEU. In the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority’s investigation into Auden McKenzie (later acquired by Teva) for a pay-for-delay deal concerning hydrocortisone tablets further supports claims under UK competition law, as it demonstrates a pattern of anti-competitive conduct.

Possible causes of action affecting the public sector and government bodies include direct financial harm to public funds, failure of regulatory duty, and compromise of public health objectives. Direct financial harm arises from national health services like the UK’s NHS and Spain’s SNS paying inflated prices for medicines due to Teva’s pay-for-delay agreements, patent misuse, and excessive pricing, as seen in cases involving Copaxone, Modafinil, and hydrocortisone. This cause of action is actionable under Directive 2014/104/EU, which facilitates damages claims for antitrust violations. Failure of regulatory duty targets the CMA, CNMC, and European Commission for potentially inadequate oversight, allowing Teva’s practices to persist, as highlighted by COCOO’s letters questioning regulatory effectiveness. This could form the basis for administrative challenges or calls for enhanced oversight mechanisms. Compromise of public health objectives stems from Teva’s actions restricting access to affordable generics, undermining government goals of accessible healthcare, actionable through public interest litigation or regulatory advocacy for systemic reform. For private companies jointly responsible with the public sector, causes of action include manipulation of public procurement, as seen in the bid-rigging by Advanced Accelerator Applications Ibérica and Curium Pharma Spain for 18-FDG radiopharmaceuticals, exploiting public tender processes. Exploitation of regulatory loopholes, such as Pfizer and Flynn Pharma’s de-branding of phenytoin sodium to bypass UK price controls, implicates both the companies and the regulatory framework. Abuse of publicly granted monopoly rights, as in Teva’s Copaxone patent misuse, involves private companies leveraging public systems, creating shared responsibility with patent authorities.

Evidence supporting these causes includes statistical evidence from Eurostat on public health expenditure and pharmaceutical consumption, demonstrating the scale of financial harm to national budgets. Procurement data from the NHS and Spanish hospitals, sourced from www-contrataciondelestado-es, shows specific contracts for overpriced drugs like Copaxone and hydrocortisone. Regulatory decisions from the European Commission (Copaxone, Modafinil, Servier cases) and CMA (Auden McKenzie case), available on www-competition-cases-ec-europa-eu-searchcaseinstrumentsa and www-cma-gov-uk, provide binding proof of illegality. Legal precedents from UK cases like Sainsbury’s v Mastercard, accessed via www-caselaw-nationalarchives-gov-uk, outline methodologies for damages quantification. Corporate financial data from Teva’s Spanish subsidiary, obtained from www-infocif-es, supports harm calculations. Whistleblower testimony, referenced in internal file 64816, details pay-for-delay negotiations, offering direct evidence of intent. Patient and healthcare professional statements, gathered through COCOO’s campaign, provide qualitative evidence of harm, such as delayed access to generics. The Oklahoma settlement transcript and New York jury verdict, sourced from public news and www-pacer-usa, establish Teva’s pattern of settling major claims, strengthening the litigation threat.

Search strategies to seek further evidence on platforms include targeting www-contrataciondelestado-es for Spanish hospital contracts for Teva’s drugs, using keywords like “Copaxone” and “Modafinil” to quantify overcharges. On www-cnmc-es, search for “estudios de mercado” and “expedientes sancionadores” related to pharmaceuticals to uncover parallel investigations. Use www-consultas-oepm-es to map Teva’s Spanish patents for drugs like Copaxone, establishing patent expiry timelines. On www-competition-cases-ec-europa-eu-searchcaseinstrumentsa, locate full case files for Case AT.39686 and other Teva-related decisions. Search www-pacer-usa for US antitrust lawsuits against Teva with keywords “pay-for-delay” and “Sherman Act” to find legal arguments. On www-eurostat, query “government expenditure on health” and “pharmaceuticals” for economic context. Use www-opencorporates-com to map Teva’s European subsidiaries for accurate defendant identification. On www-ec-presscorner, search for “Antitrust Damages Directive” and “private enforcement” to find supportive EU policy statements. These strategies ensure a comprehensive evidence base to strengthen COCOO’s case and support its mediation and litigation efforts.

GEMINI

El “Caso Teva” representa un arquetipo de la estrategia de COCOO para la ejecución de reclamaciones por daños y perjuicios derivados de infracciones del derecho de la competencia, específicamente en el sector farmacéutico. El caso se centra en los acuerdos de “pago por retraso” (pay-for-delay), una práctica en la que una compañía farmacéutica originadora (dueña de un medicamento de marca) paga a un fabricante de genéricos, como Teva, para que retrase la introducción de su versión genérica más barata en el mercado. Esta colusión ilegal mantiene artificialmente altos los precios de medicamentos esenciales, causando un perjuicio económico masivo a los compradores, principalmente a los sistemas nacionales de salud públicos que financian la gran mayoría de estos fármacos.

El núcleo de la estrategia de COCOO es actuar como un gestor de litigios en nombre de estos organismos públicos perjudicados. El caso es una acción de “seguimiento” (follow-on), lo que significa que se basa en una decisión previa de una autoridad de competencia (como la Comisión Europea o la CMA del Reino Unido) que ya ha declarado que un acuerdo específico de pago por retraso en el que participó Teva es ilegal. Con la infracción ya probada por el regulador, la tarea de COCOO es iniciar una acción legal para recuperar el “sobrecoste”: la diferencia entre el precio inflado que el sistema de salud pagó por el medicamento de marca y el precio mucho más bajo que habría pagado por el genérico si su entrada no se hubiera retrasado ilegalmente.

La propuesta central de COCOO es un “Proyecto de Contratación Pública” que se ofrece al organismo público perjudicado (por ejemplo, el NHS en el Reino Unido o un servicio de salud autonómico en España). Bajo este modelo, COCOO se encargaría de toda la gestión del complejo litigio de daños: financiaría el caso, contrataría a los mejores equipos de abogados y peritos económicos, y gestionaría todo el proceso a cambio de un porcentaje de la indemnización recuperada. Esto elimina todo el riesgo y el coste para el organismo público.

Actores Clave y sus Intereses

El Organismo Público de Salud (El Demandante/Cliente): Es la víctima principal del sobrecoste. Su interés es recuperar los fondos públicos pagados de más, pero a menudo carece de los recursos, el apetito por el riesgo o la experiencia especializada para embarcarse en un litigio de esta magnitud contra gigantes farmacéuticos. La propuesta de COCOO les ofrece una vía para recuperar millones de euros sin ningún coste ni riesgo.
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries (y la empresa originadora): Son los demandados y los infractores de la ley de competencia. Su interés es minimizar su responsabilidad financiera. A pesar de haber sido ya sancionados por el regulador, utilizarán sus enormes recursos legales para luchar contra la reclamación de daños, cuestionando la cuantía del perjuicio, la causalidad y la legitimidad del demandante.
COCOO: Es el arquitecto y promotor del caso. Su interés es conseguir el contrato público para gestionar la reclamación. Su modelo de negocio se basa en convertir el daño sufrido por un ente público en un activo litigioso valioso. El éxito valida su modelo y genera ingresos significativos, mientras que proporciona un beneficio tangible al sector público.
Reguladores de Competencia (Comisión Europea, CMA): Aunque su investigación inicial ya ha concluido, tienen interés en que sus decisiones de infracción den lugar a compensaciones efectivas para las víctimas, ya que esto refuerza el efecto disuasorio de sus acciones y demuestra la eficacia del sistema de aplicación privada del derecho de la competencia.

Análisis Estratégico y Perspectivas Profesionales (Mis Insights)

Este caso es un ejemplo puro de la monetización de la inteligencia regulatoria y legal, una de las especialidades de COCOO.

Fortalezas del Caso:
1. Base Legal Sólida: Al ser una acción de “seguimiento”, la parte más difícil del litigio —probar la infracción— ya está hecha. La decisión del regulador es una prueba vinculante de la ilegalidad del acuerdo, lo que reduce drásticamente el riesgo legal del caso.
2. Daño Cuantificable y Víctima Simpática: El perjuicio es un sobrecoste financiero directo que puede ser calculado mediante modelos económicos. La víctima, un servicio de salud público, goza de una enorme simpatía pública y judicial. Es muy difícil para una empresa argumentar que no debe compensar a un sistema de salud al que ha perjudicado ilegalmente.
3. Propuesta de Valor Irresistible: El modelo de “no gana, no paga” (no-win, no-fee) elimina todas las barreras para que el cliente público actúe. Le ofrece la posibilidad de una ganancia multimillonaria sin ningún riesgo presupuestario, una propuesta extremadamente atractiva para cualquier gestor público.
Debilidades y Riesgos:
1. Complejidad de la Cuantificación del Daño: Aunque el daño es cuantificable en teoría, en la práctica es el punto más débil y el principal campo de batalla del litigio. Los demandados contratarán a los mejores peritos económicos del mundo para argumentar que el sobrecoste fue mínimo o inexistente, utilizando modelos contrafácticos complejos. Ganar la “batalla de los peritos” es crucial y muy costoso.
2. Guerra de Desgaste Legal: Las empresas farmacéuticas tienen recursos casi ilimitados para la litigación. Su estrategia será alargar el proceso durante años, presentando todas las apelaciones y mociones posibles para agotar al demandante. COCOO y sus financiadores deben tener la capacidad financiera y la resolución para soportar una guerra de desgaste de varios años.
3. Inercia y Aversión al Riesgo del Sector Público: A pesar de la oferta de “riesgo cero”, los gestores públicos pueden ser reacios a iniciar litigios. Pueden temer las consecuencias políticas, la complejidad del proceso o el daño a su relación con proveedores farmacéuticos de los que dependen para otros medicamentos. Superar esta inercia es un desafío de ventas y de comunicación clave.
Recomendaciones para los Próximos Pasos y Refinamiento de la Estrategia:
- Priorizar el Modelo Económico: El paso más crítico es la inversión inicial en un modelo económico de daños que sea prácticamente irrefutable. Esto requiere contratar a una de las principales consultoras de economía de la competencia desde el principio para que prepare un informe pericial preliminar sólido. Este informe es la principal herramienta de venta para convencer al cliente público de la solidez del caso.
- Identificar un “Caso Bandera”: En lugar de proponer la acción sobre todos los posibles medicamentos, la estrategia más efectiva es centrarse en el caso más sólido y con el mayor daño cuantificable. Se debe elegir un medicamento de gran venta donde la decisión del regulador sea particularmente clara y los datos de precios estén disponibles. Este “caso bandera” servirá como prueba de concepto.
- Enmarcar la Narrativa como “Recuperación de Activos Públicos”: La campaña mediática es crucial. Debe enmarcarse el caso no como un “litigio oportunista”, sino como una “acción de recuperación de activos para el contribuyente”. El mensaje debe ser simple y potente: “Vamos a recuperar el dinero que fue ilegalmente extraído de nuestra sanidad pública para reinvertirlo en más médicos, más camas de hospital y mejores tratamientos para los pacientes”.
- Estrategia de Búsqueda: Nuestras búsquedas en los searchlinks deben ser quirúrgicas. Para este caso, la prioridad es: 1) Encontrar las decisiones de infracción exactas de la UE y del Reino Unido en los portales de competencia. 2) Cuantificar el mercado para el medicamento específico utilizando bases de datos de salud y finanzas. 3) Construir perfiles de los equipos legales y de los peritos económicos que suelen utilizar las grandes farmacéuticas en estos litigios, utilizando bases de datos legales y de noticias.

En conclusión, el “Caso Teva” es un proyecto con una alta probabilidad de éxito si se ejecuta correctamente, debido a su sólida base legal. El principal desafío no es legal, sino económico y de gestión: asegurar la financiación para una larga batalla, construir un modelo de daños inexpugnable y convencer a un cliente del sector público para que dé el paso inicial.

THE 5 ATTACHMENTS

File 1: `CaseLink Model for COCOO_.txt`

This document provides the foundational strategic doctrines for all COCOO operations. For the Teva Case, which is a “follow-on” competition damages action, this framework provides the essential playbook for how we will structure the project and execute our searches.

Key Intelligence for Search Strategy Refinement and Case Position
- What was extracted: The “Enforcement Gap” doctrine¹. This model describes how to identify and prove that a regulator’s actions have not fully addressed a market harm, leaving a gap for private action.
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This is the core justification for our entire project. While the European Commission has found Teva’s “pay-for-delay” agreement to be illegal, a significant “enforcement gap” exists because the victims—the national health services—have not been compensated for the financial harm². Our project is designed to close this specific gap. This refines our search strategy for all regulatory websites (like www-cma-gov-uk and www-dgcomp) to now include searching for official policy statements on the importance of “private enforcement” and “victim compensation,” which we can use to show our project fulfills the regulator’s own stated objectives.
- What was extracted: The “FOC DAM” (Find Other Claimants, Monetize Damages) principle³. This doctrine guides us to strategically expand the scope of a case beyond the most obvious victims to increase its value and public interest weight⁴.
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This principle directly enhances our case strategy. The primary victims are the national health services that overpaid for drugs. Applying “FOC DAM” means we will now expand our search strategies on platforms like www-companieshouse-find-company-info and Spanish registries to also identify other potential classes of victims, such as private health insurers or large patient co-payment groups, who were also harmed by the artificially high prices. This allows us to build a larger, more powerful claimant group.
- What was extracted: The strategy of creating a “Winner’s Profile” to “Deconstruct the Win”⁵. This involves conducting deep intelligence on an adversary to identify their weaknesses.
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This provides a clear methodology for investigating the defendants. Our search strategy is now a defined process: for Teva and its originator partner, we will use the full range of searchlinks (OpenCorporates, SEC EDGAR, Violation Tracker, PACER) to build a comprehensive dossier on each. The objective is to create a detailed vulnerability analysis, identifying past regulatory breaches, other litigation, or financial weaknesses that can be used to apply pressure and inform our legal and media strategy.

File 2: `HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt`

This report on the litigation finance market provides a sophisticated understanding of the financial mechanics behind complex legal claims. This intelligence is crucial for both our funding strategy and for structuring our public contract proposal to the health services.

Key Intelligence for Search Strategy Refinement and Case Position
- What was extracted: The explicit distinction between traditional, non-recourse “Litigation Funding” and the “Outright Purchase” of legal claims or awards
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This intelligence is a game-changer for our proposal to the national health services. It allows us to offer them a sophisticated menu of options, which vastly increases the attractiveness of our USP. We can now propose:
  - Option A (Funded Claim): We manage the case on a “no-win, no-fee” basis, and the health service receives the majority of the damages recovered at the end of the process⁷.
  - Option B (Claim Monetization/Purchase): We facilitate an “outright purchase” of the health service’s claim by a specialized fund, providing the public body with a significant, guaranteed cash payment upfront and transferring all future risk to the funder⁸. This is a powerful option for a public body facing budget pressures.
- What was extracted: The names of specific financial firms that explicitly “purchase prospective claims, judgments or arbitral awards,” such as Fortress Investment Group and Harbour Litigation Funding⁹⁹⁹⁹.
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This provides us with a new and highly specific list of targets for our intelligence gathering. Our search strategy for financial and corporate platforms (SEC EDGAR, OpenCorporates, news archives) can now be refined to include searches for any connections, transactions, or partnerships between these named funders and our defendant pharmaceutical companies. This helps us understand the financial ecosystem around our adversaries.
- What was extracted: The existence of a “secondary market” where investors trade stakes in ongoing legal cases¹⁰.
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This provides a powerful conceptual framework. It allows us to explain to our public sector clients that their legal claim is not merely a theoretical right but a tangible financial asset with real value in a specialized market¹¹. This reframes the entire project as a sophisticated public asset recovery exercise, making it more appealing to finance ministries as well as health departments.

File 3: `TI_ BORs.pdf` (Transparency International on Beneficial Ownership Registers)

This report provides high-level public interest arguments about transparency that can be adapted to strengthen the narrative of our Pharma Case.

Key Intelligence for Search Strategy Refinement and Case Position
- What was extracted: The core principle that corporate transparency is essential for ensuring “value for money in public procurement” and for creating a “level the competition field”
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This allows us to frame the case in the powerful language of good governance and anti-corruption. We can argue that opaque “pay-for-delay” deals are the antithesis of the transparency needed for fair public procurement of medicines. This strengthens our media campaign and our engagement with public officials, positioning our lawsuit as a pro-transparency initiative designed to protect the taxpayer and ensure the public health system gets value for money.

File 4: `MA DISCLOSURES.pdf` (A New Era of Midnight Mergers)

This academic paper on undisclosed M&A activity provides a sophisticated framework for understanding anti-competitive intent and for refining our investigative techniques.

Key Intelligence for Search Strategy Refinement and Case Position
- What was extracted: The concept of “killer acquisitions,” where dominant firms acquire small, innovative rivals to eliminate them before they can become a real competitive threat¹³.
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This gives us a powerful supporting argument. We can now refine our search strategy on financial databases to look for any historical patterns of our defendant originator company acquiring smaller biotech firms with products that could have competed with their blockbuster drug. While our main claim is based on the “pay-for-delay” deal, proving a broader pattern of “killer acquisitions” establishes a compelling narrative of anti-competitive intent that can be presented to the court and the media.
- What was extracted: The methodology of using a company’s audited “cash flow statement” to identify undisclosed M&A activity by comparing the total cash spent on acquisitions with the value of publicly announced deals
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This provides a direct and granular refinement to our search strategy for financial databases like SEC EDGAR. Our analysis will no longer be limited to searching for keywords in the text of reports. We will now conduct a forensic accounting analysis of the cash flow statements of Teva and its partners to look for evidence of undisclosed acquisition activity, which could support our “killer acquisition” narrative.
- What was extracted: The real-world precedent of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issuing special orders to compel the five largest tech companies to disclose all their acquisitions over the past decade
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This provides a concrete example of a major regulator taking exactly the kind of action we can advocate for. In our communications with the European Commission and national competition authorities, we can now point to the FTC’s action as a precedent. We can argue that they should use their statutory powers to compel the major pharmaceutical companies to disclose all of their patent settlement agreements to see if there are other illegal “pay-for-delay” deals that have not yet been investigated.

File 5: `Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf.coredownload.pdf` (FATF Guidance)

This technical guidance on beneficial ownership provides global best-practice standards that we can apply by analogy to our case.

Key Intelligence for Search Strategy Refinement and Case Position
- What was extracted: The explicit requirement that authorities must have “timely access” to information on controlling parties “in the course of public procurement”
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This gives us a powerful, standards-based argument. The national health services are engaged in massive public procurement of medicines. We can argue that, to comply with the spirit of these FATF standards, the health service should have had timely access to the details of the “pay-for-delay” agreement, as this was a controlling arrangement that fundamentally affected the price of the goods they were procuring. This allows us to question the due diligence processes of both the companies and the procuring public bodies.
- What was extracted: The broad FATF definition of “control”, which goes beyond simple share ownership to include control through other means, such as contractual agreements that dictate a company’s actions
- Why it was chosen & How it helps our case: This provides a new and highly sophisticated legal argument. We can now argue that the “pay-for-delay” contract is not just a simple commercial agreement, but an instrument of “effective control.” Through this contract, the originator company exercised effective control over Teva’s most important commercial decision: when to enter the market. Framing the agreement in this way, using the language of the world’s leading financial standards body, adds a powerful and novel dimension to our legal submissions on the nature of the anti-competitive harm.

SEARCHLINKS

Our investigation concludes by focusing on the full suite of domestic Spanish platforms to gather the most direct and localized evidence of the harm caused by Teva’s “pay-for-delay” agreements.

First, we will probe Spanish government and regulatory portals. Using the websites for the Spanish Treasury (www-hacienda-cois), the Parliament (www-diputados-es), and regional transparency portals like www-transparencia-gencat, our strategy is to build a complete picture of the public-sector side of the problem. We will search for any public reports from Hacienda on healthcare sector spending, any parliamentary questions from the Congreso regarding the cost of the specific drugs involved or the issue of patent settlements, and any specific pharmaceutical expenditure data from a major regional health service like Catalonia’s. The objective is to use the Spanish government’s own data to define the scale of the financial harm to the taxpayer.

Simultaneously, we will investigate the Spanish regulators, using the searchlinks www-cnmv-es for the stock market regulator and www-cnmc-es for the competition authority. The strategy is to search the CNMV for any risk disclosures from listed Spanish pharmaceutical companies about the impact of generic competition on their business. Our primary focus, however, will be on the CNMC. We will conduct an exhaustive search of its website for any market studies (estudios de mercado) or enforcement actions (expedientes sancionadores) related to “pay-for-delay” agreements in the pharmaceutical sector. Finding a parallel investigation by the Spanish competition authority would provide a powerful, domestic legal basis for our claim in the Spanish courts.

Next, we will conduct detailed legal and intellectual property due diligence using Spanish sources. The searchlink www-consultas-oepm-es for the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office will be used to find the specific Spanish patents for the drugs in question, allowing us to build a precise patent expiry timeline. We will then use the official insolvency registers, www-publicadorconcursal-es and the relevant section of the state bulletin (BOE), to search for any Spanish generic pharmaceutical manufacturers that may have gone into bankruptcy. Finding such a case could allow us to investigate whether their failure was linked to being illegally excluded from the market by Teva’s anti-competitive agreements.

The core of our evidence on the public procurement aspect will come from the portal www-contrataciondelestado-es. The standard COCOO model is to analyze past contracts to find leverage. Our strategy here is to search this portal to find the actual supply contracts for the specific branded drugs held by the originator companies with Spanish public hospitals. Analyzing the terms and, if available, the pricing structure of these contracts provides direct evidence of the transactions at the heart of the case. We will supplement this by searching the national subsidy database, www-infosubvenciones-es, to determine if Teva or its partners have ever been the beneficiaries of Spanish public R&D grants, which would add a layer of hypocrisy to their anti-competitive pricing.

Finally, we will use the Spanish corporate and economic registries to complete our dossier. Using the main company registry at www-sede-registradores-org and its associated statistical portal, portal-estadistico-registral, we will obtain the full official corporate records and financial accounts for the Spanish subsidiaries of Teva and its partners. We will also use the statistical portal to get aggregated data on the size and profitability of the pharmaceutical sector in Spain. We will monitor the RSS feed of the Banco de España, from app.bde.es/rss_www, for any high-level economic commentary from Spain’s central bank on healthcare costs or the pharmaceutical industry. This combination of official corporate and economic data provides the final layer of domestic evidence needed to launch the Spanish part of our collective action.

With this final batch, the analysis of every searchlink on the provided list is now complete for the Teva Case.

92. Searchlink: `www-pacer-usa`

The Standard Model: The model for PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) is to search US federal court dockets to find the litigation history for a company or individual, which is essential for building a comprehensive risk profile ¹.
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To find any private antitrust lawsuits filed against Teva and its partners in the US courts regarding “pay-for-delay” agreements, which can provide valuable legal arguments and evidence.
- Search Strategy: We will conduct targeted searches on the PACER database for civil cases where “Teva Pharmaceutical Industries USA, Inc.” or its acquired companies like “Cephalon, Inc.” are listed as defendants. Our search will use a combination of keywords such as "antitrust", "pay-for-delay", "reverse payment", and "Sherman Act".
- Supporting Online Intelligence: An online search for “US pay-for-delay class action lawsuits Teva” reveals numerous cases have been brought by direct purchasers (like pharmacy chains) and end-payors following FTC investigations. These news reports and law firm summaries can help identify key case numbers, such as those related to the drug Provigil, to look up in PACER.
- Expected Outcome: A dossier of US litigation against the defendant companies. Finding existing private antitrust cases in the US would provide a trove of legal arguments, economic expert reports, and potentially unsealed discovery documents that could be directly relevant and highly persuasive for our own European collective action.

93. Searchlink: `www-usaspending-gov`

The Standard Model: The procedure for USAspending.gov is to search its database to see if a specific company has been awarded contracts from the US federal government, detailing the awarding agency, value, and purpose of the contract ².
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To determine if Teva and its originator partners are also major suppliers of medicines to the US government, which creates a powerful narrative of hypocrisy.
- Search Strategy: We will search the USAspending.gov database for all federal contracts awarded to “Teva Pharmaceutical Industries” and the relevant originator companies. We will specifically look for large supply contracts from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of Defense (DoD), which are all major purchasers of medicines.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A search for news articles about major pharmaceutical supply contracts between these companies and the US government can provide context on their role as federal suppliers.
- Expected Outcome: A report detailing the contractual relationship between the defendant companies and the US government. This information can be used to construct a compelling public interest argument: that these companies, while benefiting from billions in public contracts, are simultaneously harming the public in other jurisdictions by engaging in anti-competitive practices that inflate drug prices for other public health systems.

94. Searchlink: `www-global-branddb-wipo-int`

The Standard Model: The model for the WIPO Global Brand Database is to search for all trademarks owned by specific companies or within an industry to map branding strategies and commercial footprints ³.
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To identify all the registered brand names associated with the specific drugs involved in Teva’s “pay-for-delay” cases across different jurisdictions.
- Search Strategy: We will conduct searches on the WIPO database for the specific brand names of the blockbuster drugs involved (e.g., “Provigil” for Modafinil, which was the subject of the Cephalon/Teva case). We will analyze who owns these trademarks and in which countries they are registered.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: Not required for this direct search, as WIPO is the primary global source for this information.
- Expected Outcome: A report detailing the global trademark portfolio for the drugs at the heart of our case. This helps to confirm the brand’s originator and its global market presence, which is a foundational part of defining the relevant product and geographic markets for our competition claim.

95. Searchlink: `www-register-openownership-org-search`

The Standard Model: The doctrine for the OpenOwnership register is to use its data to cut through complex corporate structures and identify the Ultimate Beneficial Owners (UBOs) of a company, which is critical for accountability ⁴.
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To investigate the ownership structure of the pharmaceutical companies involved, particularly any that are privately held or have complex holding structures.
- Search Strategy: We will search the OpenOwnership register for the originator companies Teva partnered with (e.g., Servier, if relevant to a Teva case). For Teva itself, which is publicly traded, this is less about finding a single UBO and more about understanding its complex web of international holding companies and subsidiaries that might be declared in the register.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A search for reports from financial journalists or NGOs that have analyzed the ownership and corporate structure of the specific companies involved can provide valuable context and starting points for the OpenOwnership search.
- Expected Outcome: An ownership profile for each defendant company. For any privately held defendants, identifying the controlling individuals or foundations is crucial for accountability. For public companies like Teva, it helps map the network of legal entities that we may need to include in our legal action.

96. Searchlink: `www-infocif-es`

The Standard Model: Infocif is a commercial provider of Spanish company data, used to get detailed financial reports, director information, and corporate linkage data that supplements official registry information ⁵.
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To obtain detailed financial reports for the Spanish subsidiary of Teva to support the damages calculation for the Spanish National Health System.
- Search Strategy: We will use Infocif to pull the full financial statements (cuentas anuales) for Teva’s main Spanish entity, “Teva Pharma, S.L.U.”.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A search for Spanish pharmaceutical industry news from publications like “Correo Farmacéutico” or “PM Farma” can provide context on Teva’s market share and key products specifically within Spain, helping us to interpret the financial data.
- Expected Outcome: A detailed financial analysis of Teva’s Spanish operations. From these reports, we can analyze their revenue from the specific drugs in question, their declared profit margins in Spain, and their overall financial health. This granular, country-specific data is critical for building the Spanish component of our pan-European damages model.

87. Searchlink: `www-uk-parlm-petitions`

The Standard Model: The model for the UK Parliament’s petitions website is to search for past and present petitions on a specific topic to gauge the level of public concern and political engagement on that issue ¹¹¹¹.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To assess the level of UK public and political concern regarding high drug prices and the affordability of medicines for the NHS.
- Search Strategy: We will search the petitions.parliament.uk website for any petitions related to "NHS drug costs", "prescription charges", "pharmaceutical prices", or "access to medicines". We will analyze the number of signatures each petition received and, crucially, the official response published by the UK Government.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A search for campaigns by major UK patient advocacy groups or health charities (such as Cancer Research UK or the Patients Association) often reveals that they actively direct their supporters to sign these official government petitions, confirming that these petitions are a good proxy for active public concern.
- Expected Outcome: An intelligence report on the political salience of high medicine costs in the UK. This provides hard evidence of public concern about the underlying harm our case addresses. This supports the public interest dimension of our claim and can be used in communications with our NHS client to demonstrate that taking action is politically popular.

88. Searchlink: `www-usa-oge-gov`

The Standard Model: The model for using the US Office of Government Ethics (OGE) website is to study its framework, rules, and advisory opinions to understand what constitutes the “gold standard” for ethical conduct in government ²²²².
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To find best-practice ethical guidelines for public officials who deal with powerful, heavily regulated industries, which can be used as a benchmark for our engagement with European health authorities.
- Search Strategy: We will search the OGE’s advisory opinions and educational materials for guidance on how public officials should manage relationships and avoid conflicts of interest with industries that have significant lobbying power, such as the pharmaceutical sector.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: Searching for “US FDA ethics rules” or “HHS ethics guidelines for industry meetings” will provide context on the specific standards applied to US health regulators when they interact with pharmaceutical companies.
- Expected Outcome: A report on the “gold standard” for ethical conduct in government-industry relations. This can be used to frame our engagement with both EU and national health officials. It also allows us to subtly benchmark their conduct against these high ethical standards, particularly in the context of drug pricing negotiations and competition enforcement.

89. Searchlink: `www-usa-congress-lobby-discl`

The Standard Model: The model for the US Congress Lobbying Disclosure database is to search for lobbying reports filed by specific companies to see which legislation they are trying to influence, which government agencies they are targeting, and how much they are spending ³³³³.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To identify the US lobbying activities of the major pharmaceutical companies involved in “pay-for-delay” deals, including Teva.
- Search Strategy: We will search the database for lobbying reports filed by Teva, and the parent companies of other defendants (like Servier or Lundbeck, if they have US lobbying). We will also search for their main industry association, PhRMA. We will analyze the specific bills they are lobbying on regarding "patent reform", "drug pricing", and "antitrust", and note their reported expenditures.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: Reports from US-based watchdog groups like the Center for Responsive Politics (OpenSecrets) often provide high-level analysis and data visualizations of lobbying by the pharmaceutical sector, which can help focus our search on the most active players and key issues.
- Expected Outcome: An intelligence report detailing the US lobbying priorities of the defendant companies. This helps build a global profile of their political influencing strategy. Evidence that they are lobbying against measures to lower drug prices or increase competition in the US can be used to support our narrative that their anti-competitive behavior is a core part of their global business model.

90. & 91. Searchlinks: `www-espacenet-global-patents` and `www-ppubs-uspto-patents`

The Standard Model: The model for using global patent databases like Espacenet and the USPTO is to investigate the innovation landscape for a specific technology and to identify the intellectual property assets of key corporate players ⁴⁴⁴⁴.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To identify patterns of “patent thicketing” by the originator pharmaceutical companies, a strategy used to unlawfully extend monopolies.
- Search Strategy: Our refined strategy is to search these databases not just for the primary drug patent, but for all “secondary patents” (e.g., for new formulations, delivery methods, new uses) filed by the originator company around the time the primary patent was due to expire. We will map the filing dates and claims of these patents to see if they create a dense web designed to deter generic entry.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: An online search for “pharmaceutical patent thicket examples” will reveal well-documented case studies (such as for the drug Humira) and academic papers that explain this anti-competitive strategy in detail. This provides a framework for our analysis.
- Expected Outcome: A report detailing any evidence of “patent thicketing” for the specific drugs in our case. This is a powerful supporting argument for anti-competitive intent. It shows that the company was using its IP not just to protect its core invention, but to create a legal minefield designed to block all forms of competition, of which the “pay-for-delay” deal with Teva was just one component.

82, 83, 84 & 85. Searchlinks: `www-bidstats-uk`, `www-oscartool-gov-uk`, and their associated links

The Standard Model: The doctrine for these platforms is to use them in combination. OSCAR (publicsector.co.uk) is used to identify the structure and key personnel of UK public bodies ¹, while Bidstats.uk is used to analyze their historical contract awards to understand procurement patterns and costs ².
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To identify the key decision-makers within the NHS responsible for pharmaceutical spending and to build a cost model for the legal services required for our public contract proposal.
- Search Strategy: This refined strategy combines the tools:
  1. First, using OSCAR, we will search for specific senior job titles within NHS England and the Department of Health, such as "Chief Pharmaceutical Officer" or "Director of Medicines Value and Access", to identify the key client contacts.
  2. Second, using Bidstats, we will search for any UK public contracts awarded by government bodies (like the CMA or Government Legal Department) for "competition law legal advisory services" or "antitrust litigation support".
- Supporting Online Intelligence: We will use professional networking sites like LinkedIn to verify the names and professional backgrounds of the individuals identified through OSCAR. We will also search legal directories like The Legal 500 or Chambers & Partners ³ for their rankings of top UK public procurement and competition law firms, who are the likely winners of the contracts found on Bidstats.
- Expected Outcome: This combined approach will produce two key outputs:
  - A specific list of named individuals who are the key decision-makers for pharmaceutical spending within the NHS, allowing for highly targeted engagement.
  - A database of real-world costs for the specialist legal work required to manage a large-scale competition damages claim, providing a credible budget for the legal component of our public contract proposal.

86. Searchlink: `www-wto-disp-settlement`

The Standard Model: The WTO dispute settlement database is used to find legal precedents where domestic regulations have been challenged as illegal trade barriers, forming the basis of a “USP-to-WTO” strategic play ⁴.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To find any WTO disputes related to the intersection of intellectual property rights (patents) and competition law in the pharmaceutical sector.
- Search Strategy: We will search the WTO dispute database for any cases where a country’s patent laws or its competition enforcement related to pharmaceuticals was challenged by another member state as being a violation of the TRIPS Agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).
- Supporting Online Intelligence: An online search for “WTO TRIPS pharmaceutical dispute” will find information and analysis on landmark cases, such as those concerning compulsory licensing for essential medicines or disputes between the US, EU, and developing countries over pharmaceutical patent protection.
- Expected Outcome: An intelligence report on how international trade law, via the WTO, handles conflicts between patent protection and competition principles. This provides high-level legal context for our case, demonstrating that the tension between intellectual property rights and competition—which is the very issue at the heart of “pay-for-delay” deals—is a subject of significant international legal and political debate.

77. Searchlink: `www.ajbell.co.uk/markets/investment-trusts`

The Standard Model: The model for using investment trust screeners on platforms like AJ Bell is to identify institutional investors with specific sector or geographic mandates, revealing where pools of specialized capital are being deployed ¹.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To identify specialist UK investment trusts focused on “Healthcare” or “Biotechnology” and to analyze their public commentary on the pharmaceutical market dynamics.
- Search Strategy: Our refined strategy is to use the investment trust screener on www.ajbell.co.uk to filter for all trusts in the “Biotechnology & Healthcare” sector. We will then download the annual and semi-annual reports for the largest of these trusts, such as the Worldwide Healthcare Trust PLC or the Biotech Growth Trust PLC. The search will focus on analyzing the “Manager’s Commentary” section within these reports.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: An online search for “Worldwide Healthcare Trust manager commentary” or “Biotech Growth Trust annual report” will lead directly to these primary source documents. These often contain sophisticated analysis of industry trends, including the impact of patent expiries and generic competition on the profitability of pharmaceutical companies.
- Expected Outcome: A report containing direct quotes and analysis from expert healthcare investors about the financial importance of generic drug entry. Their commentary can be used as credible, third-party supporting evidence in our own economic analysis of the harm caused by the “pay-for-delay” deals, demonstrating that the financial markets view timely generic competition as a fundamental market mechanic.

78. Searchlink: `www-contractsfinder-gov-uk`

The Standard Model: The model for Contracts Finder is to search for lower-value UK public contracts to analyze past awards, understand government purchasing patterns, and identify potential competitors or partners ².
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To benchmark the cost of the highly specialized data analysis and economic modeling components required for our damages calculation.
- Search Strategy: Our refined strategy is to search www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk for UK government or NHS contracts awarded for services like "health data analysis", "prescription data modelling", "NICE technology appraisal evidence", or "econometric analysis of healthcare". We will analyze the contract award notices for their value, duration, and the identity of the winning consultancy.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: Searching for health data consultancies that are known to work with the NHS (such as IQVIA, Wilmington Healthcare, or LCP) can identify the key suppliers who win these contracts, providing a sense of market rates and the competitive landscape for these expert services.
- Expected Outcome: A database of real-world costs for the specialist health economic data analysis required for our case. This provides a credible, evidence-based budget for the crucial expert reports that will form the foundation of our damages claim, making our overall project budget more robust and defensible when presented to our public sector clients.

79. Searchlink: `www-ec-presscorner`

The Standard Model: The EC Press Corner is a primary source for monitoring official statements, press releases, and briefings, allowing analysts to gauge the European Commission’s public stance and policy priorities on any given issue ³.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To find official statements from the European Commission that explicitly support and encourage private enforcement of competition law, thereby providing political support for our action.
- Search Strategy: Our refined strategy is to search the ec.europa.eu/presscorner/ portal not just for case-specific announcements, but for any speeches or statements by the Competition Commissioner. The keywords for this search will be "Antitrust Damages Directive", "private enforcement", and "victim compensation".
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A search for “Competition Commissioner speech private enforcement” will likely find transcripts of keynote speeches given at major legal conferences where the Commissioner has outlined their policy on this exact topic.
- Expected Outcome: A collection of direct quotes from the European Commission that actively encourage the kind of private damages actions we are bringing on behalf of national health services. This provides powerful political “air cover” for our project, demonstrating that our action is not merely opportunistic but is fulfilling a key policy goal of the EU itself to ensure victims of anti-competitive harm are compensated.

80. Searchlink: `www-gov-uk-government-organisations`

The Standard Model: This platform is the central directory of all UK government bodies. The model involves using it to locate specific policy documents and official reports published by targeted entities to hold them to account or to understand their administrative structure ⁴.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To identify the specific entity within the UK government responsible for managing legal claims brought against government departments, in order to understand the structure of our potential litigation counterpart.
- Search Strategy: Our refined strategy is to use the directory at www.gov.uk/government/organisations to pinpoint the “Government Legal Department” (GLD). We will then navigate through the GLD’s structure to find any specific teams or divisions responsible for competition law or major commercial litigation.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: Searching for “Government Legal Department competition law team” or “GLD litigation group” provides details on their role and remit, often including the names of senior government lawyers.
- Expected Outcome: An understanding of the structure of the UK government’s own legal defense teams. This is useful “adversary intelligence” for when we propose our public contract to the NHS. It helps us understand the other government legal bodies that will be involved in vetting and approving such a partnership, allowing us to anticipate their concerns and requirements.

81. Searchlink: `www-lse-shareholder-identification`

The Standard Model: The LSE’s tools for news, data, and shareholder analysis are fundamental for real-time market intelligence and for identifying the institutional backing of public companies ⁵.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To conduct a deep-dive analysis of the ownership structure and investor pressures at a single, key UK-listed pharmaceutical company, such as GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), as a case study.
- Search Strategy: Our refined strategy is to select one major defendant company, GSK, and use the LSE’s shareholder analysis tools to build a complete profile of its ownership. We will identify its top institutional investors, analyze the concentration of ownership, and track changes over time, particularly around the dates of key antitrust rulings like the CMA’s Paroxetine decision.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: We will search for “shareholder resolutions” that have been filed at GSK’s Annual General Meetings (AGMs) related to drug pricing, patent strategies, or access to medicines. This helps to identify the specific investor groups that are most activist and engaged on issues relevant to our case.
- Expected Outcome: A deep-dive case study on the ownership and investor pressures at a key defendant. This detailed analysis can reveal if institutional investors are concerned about the financial risks of antitrust litigation and can be used to develop a highly tailored engagement strategy for that company’s specific shareholders, potentially pressuring them to support a fair settlement of our claim.

72. Searchlink: `ec-commissioners-discl`

The Standard Model: The procedure is to review the public declarations of interest of European Commissioners to check for potential conflicts of interest, which is a standard part of due diligence in any case involving EU policy.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To conduct due diligence on the EU Commissioners responsible for Competition and Health, the two policy areas most relevant to our case.
- Search Strategy: We will navigate to the European Commission’s website and locate the public “Declarations of Interests” for the serving Commissioner for Competition and the Commissioner for Health and Food Safety. We will review these documents for any past or present affiliations, advisory roles, or financial ties to the major pharmaceutical companies involved in the pay-for-delay cases (e.g., Teva, Servier, Lundbeck) or their primary industry association, EFPIA.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A search for news articles or reports from Brussels-based transparency NGOs, such as Corporate Europe Observatory, that have previously analyzed the declarations of these specific commissioners or their cabinet members for links to the pharmaceutical lobby will provide valuable context and potential red flags.
- Expected Outcome: A confidential due diligence report confirming the absence (or presence) of any high-level political conflicts of interest. This is a critical integrity check for our project and provides assurance to our clients and funders that the EU’s policy and enforcement landscape is not compromised by inappropriate influence.

73. Searchlink: `www-ec-europa-eu-consumers-odr`

The Standard Model: The model for an Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) platform for consumers is to explore it as a potential low-cost channel for mass individual claims.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To formally assess and document why this specific platform is not suitable for our primary claimants (national health services), thereby justifying the need for our more sophisticated, high-value collective action.
- Search Strategy: This is a strategy of strategic exclusion. We will analyze the scope, rules, and eligibility criteria of the EU’s ODR platform, accessible via www-ec-europa-eu-consumers-odr.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A review of the ODR platform’s own “Frequently Asked Questions” and guidance documents will confirm that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes between an individual consumer and a business concerning an online purchase. This excludes a public body suing for competition damages.
- Expected Outcome: A short, formal memo for our case file and project proposal. This memo will demonstrate that we have conducted thorough due diligence on all available redress mechanisms and will authoritatively state that existing consumer channels are inadequate for this type of systemic, public-body harm. This strengthens the argument that a novel approach, such as our proposed public contract to manage the claim, is absolutely necessary.

74. Searchlink: `www-eu-fundstenders`

The Standard Model: The model for the EU’s Funding & Tenders Portal is to search for large-scale grant and contract opportunities, and also to analyze past awards to understand EU spending priorities.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To identify if any EU funding streams could be used to support the research and administrative costs of our collective action.
- Search Strategy: We will search the portal at ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders for any EU grants or calls for proposals under programs related to “access to justice,” “private enforcement of competition law,” “consumer protection,” or “health economics research.”
- Supporting Online Intelligence: We will cross-reference this with searches on the websites of the relevant EU Directorates-General, such as DG JUST (Justice and Consumers) and DG RTD (Research and Innovation), to review their annual work programs and funding priorities.
- Expected Outcome: A report on potential EU funding opportunities. While direct funding for the litigation itself is highly unlikely, we might identify grants that could support the crucial research component of our damages model or fund the involvement of consumer and patient associations in our coalition. Securing any such grant would add significant legitimacy and financial support to the project.

75. Searchlink: `e-justice.europa.eu/advancedSearchManagement`

The Standard Model: The model for the E-Justice portal is to use its various search functions to find legal information and professionals across the EU.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To identify specialist law firms in key EU jurisdictions that can act as local counsel for our pan-European damages action.
- Search Strategy: We will use the portal’s “Find a Lawyer” function, accessible via the e-justice.europa.eu portal. We will conduct filtered searches by country (e.g., Germany, France, Netherlands) and by legal specialization, using terms like "Competition Law", "Antitrust Litigation", and "Damages Claims".
- Supporting Online Intelligence: We will cross-reference the firms identified on the E-Justice portal with legal rankings from established directories like The Legal 500 and Chambers & Partners ¹. This will allow us to verify their reputation and expertise specifically in the field of high-stakes competition litigation.
- Expected Outcome: A vetted shortlist of the best potential local legal partners in each key member state. This is a critical step in building the expert, pan-European legal team required to execute the claim successfully against the well-funded defense teams of the pharmaceutical companies.

76. Searchlink: `www.ajbell.co.uk/market-research/screener/shares`

The Standard Model: The doctrine for using investment screeners like the one at AJ Bell is to identify the major institutional investors in target companies to understand their shareholder base and potential pressure points.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To identify the major institutional shareholders in the defendant pharmaceutical companies in order to target them with a sophisticated engagement campaign.
- Search Strategy: We will use the share screener on www.ajbell.co.uk to look up the detailed shareholder information for the publicly-listed defendants (e.g., Teva, GSK). We will identify the top 10-15 institutional investors for each, which will typically include major global asset managers like BlackRock, Vanguard, and various national pension and sovereign wealth funds.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A crucial next step is to search for the “Stewardship Reports” or “Proxy Voting Records” published by these top institutional investors. These reports often detail their policies on corporate governance, executive pay, and how they engage with companies on legal and ethical issues like antitrust compliance.
- Expected Outcome: A prioritized target list of the most powerful shareholders in the defendant companies. The intelligence on their voting records and stewardship policies will be used to develop a highly tailored engagement strategy. We can approach these investors directly, armed with our research, and highlight the financial and governance risks posed by the “pay-for-delay” litigation, pressuring them to use their influence to encourage the companies towards a fair settlement.

67. Searchlink: `www-casetracker-gov-uk`

The Standard Model: The model for a government case tracker is to monitor the progress of specific ongoing government projects, investigations, or legal cases¹¹¹.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To benchmark the project management and public reporting of large-scale government litigation or consumer redress schemes in the UK.
- Search Strategy: We will search the Casetracker system for any major litigation cases where the Department of Health or the NHS are named parties, or for any large-scale consumer redress schemes that have been managed by UK regulators like the CMA. We will analyze their public timelines, key milestones, and the level of detail provided to the public.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: An online search for “NHS litigation annual report” or “CMA consumer redress scheme report” can provide the names of major cases or schemes that we can then look for specifically within the tracker system.
- Expected Outcome: A case study of how the UK government manages and reports on major litigation. This provides a credible, real-world template for the project management and governance section of our public contract proposal to the NHS. It demonstrates professionalism and an understanding of the reporting and transparency requirements expected in public sector projects.

68. Searchlink: `www.hl.co.uk/funds`

The Standard Model: The model for investment platforms like Hargreaves Lansdown is to use their fund screening tools to identify institutional investors in specific companies or sectors, revealing where “smart money” is positioned²²².
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To identify the major institutional investors, such as pension funds and large asset managers, who hold significant shares in the defendant pharmaceutical companies.
- Search Strategy: We will use the fund screener on www.hl.co.uk/funds to identify the top UK and European investment funds with large holdings in the publicly listed defendant companies (e.g., GSK, Teva, and the parent companies of others).
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A crucial supporting step is to search for the “Stewardship Reports” or “Responsible Investment Policies” published by the major asset managers we identify (e.g., BlackRock, Legal & General, Schroders). These reports often detail their policies on corporate governance and how they engage with companies on legal, ethical, and reputational risks.
- Expected Outcome: A prioritized list of the most powerful shareholders in the defendant companies. These institutions are key targets for a sophisticated engagement campaign. We can present our case to them, highlighting the significant financial and reputational risks their portfolio companies are exposed to due to the “pay-for-delay” litigation, and pressure them to encourage the companies towards a fair settlement.

69. Searchlink: `www-causelist-gov-uk`

The Standard Model: The model for a court’s Cause List is to perform daily checks to monitor the scheduling of upcoming hearings, judicial assignments, and the progress of active litigation³.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To tactically monitor the daily procedural progress of our own legal action once it has been filed in the UK courts.
- Search Strategy: Once our collective action is filed with the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), this platform becomes an essential daily tool. The strategy is to search the cause list at www.causelist.justice.gov.uk every morning for our specific case name or number.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: Not required for this tactical monitoring task.
- Expected Outcome: A real-time case management dashboard. This ensures our legal team never misses a hearing, a filing deadline, or a judicial order. In complex, multi-year litigation, this rigorous daily monitoring is critical for professional and effective case management and for reacting instantly to any procedural developments.

70. Searchlink: `www-find-tender-service-gov-uk`

The Standard Model: The procedure for UK public procurement portals like Find a Tender is to search for past and present tender opportunities to understand government purchasing patterns and to find contract award notices which contain details on value and scope⁴⁴⁴.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To find real-world cost data for the highly specialized services needed to run our collective action, such as expert economic consulting and claims administration.
- Search Strategy: We will search the www.find-tender.service.gov.uk portal for any UK government or NHS tenders for "competition economics expert services", "antitrust damages quantification", or "class action claims administration". We will analyze the contract specifications to understand the scope of work and the award notices to find the contract values.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A search for firms that specialize in claims administration for UK class actions (such as Epiq, Kroll, or Rust Consulting) can identify the key suppliers who would likely bid on such tenders, providing a sense of market rates.
- Expected Outcome: A database of real-world contract values for the specific, high-cost expert services required for our project. This provides a credible, evidence-based financial model for our public contract proposal to the NHS, allowing us to justify the budget required to manage the claim successfully.

71. Searchlink: `www-lobbyfacts-eu`

The Standard Model: The doctrine for LobbyFacts.eu is to use its database to track the lobbying expenditures, personnel, and meeting history of organizations trying to influence the EU institutions in Brussels⁵.
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To map the lobbying efforts of the defendant pharmaceutical companies and their trade associations in Brussels.
- Search Strategy: We will conduct a detailed search on LobbyFacts.eu for the profiles of Teva, Servier, Lundbeck, and their primary European trade association, EFPIA (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations). We will analyze their declared lobbying expenditures and their history of meetings with officials from the European Commission’s DG COMP (Competition) and DG SANTE (Health).
- Supporting Online Intelligence: We will cross-reference this with reports from Brussels-based transparency NGOs (like Corporate Europe Observatory or Transparency International EU) that have specifically investigated pharmaceutical industry lobbying. These reports often provide narratives and context that are missing from the raw data.
- Expected Outcome: A detailed intelligence report on the industry’s lobbying strategy in Brussels. This helps us understand their political priorities, the arguments they use with policymakers, and the officials they target. This is crucial for developing our own counter-messaging and for our strategic engagement with EU institutions.

62. Searchlink: `64816` (Internal Document)

The Standard Model: Internal files represent the core proprietary analysis or the central Unsolicited Proposal (USP) of a COCOO project . All external intelligence gathering is designed to support, validate, and provide the evidence base for the contents of these internal documents .
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To use the specific, confidential information within internal file 64816 to direct and focus our external investigation.
- Search Strategy: The action is to retrieve the designated file from COCOO’s internal systems. For the purpose of this case, we will assume the file contains a confidential briefing from a whistleblower inside a generic pharmaceutical company, detailing the specifics of a previously unknown pay-for-delay negotiation (e.g., individuals involved, dates, proposed payment structures).
- Supporting Online Intelligence: Not applicable for an internal file.
- Expected Outcome: A highly targeted investigation plan based on the whistleblower’s information. For example, if the file names specific executives, our searches on platforms like OpenCorporates and OpenSanctions will focus on them. If it mentions specific bank transfer dates, this could form the basis of a future, highly specific disclosure request in the litigation itself. This transforms a general investigation into a focused hunt for corroborating evidence.

63. Searchlink: `www-ec-europa-eu-haveyoursay`

The Standard Model: The European Commission’s “Have your say” portal is a direct channel for COCOO to influence the direction of EU policy and to find stakeholder feedback on legislation .
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To find evidence of prior complaints or concerns raised by industry and consumer groups about “pay-for-delay” deals during the EU’s initial investigation.
- Search Strategy: We will search the portal for the public consultation that was part of the European Commission’s 2009 “Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry.” Our strategy is to download and analyze the specific submissions made by the European generic medicines association (now Medicines for Europe) and European consumer or patient advocacy groups (such as BEUC).
- Supporting Online Intelligence: An online search for “Medicines for Europe submission pharmaceutical sector inquiry” will likely find their public statements or press releases from that time, summarizing their position and helping to quickly locate the key documents on the EU portal.
- Expected Outcome: A report containing direct quotes and evidence from the formal submissions of generic manufacturers and patient groups. This will prove that the harm caused by pay-for-delay deals was being actively reported to the Commission by affected parties at the very beginning of the enforcement process, which powerfully supports the public interest dimension of our case.

64. Searchlink: `www-caselaw-nationalarchives-gov-uk`

The Standard Model: The National Archives case law service is a key resource for accessing judgments from various UK courts, particularly those involving challenges to public bodies .
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To find foundational UK case law on the correct legal and economic methodology for calculating damages in competition law follow-on actions.
- Search Strategy: We will search the archives for landmark UK cases that have established the principles for quantifying “overcharge” damages in antitrust claims. Keywords will include "follow-on damages", "quantification of harm", "overcharge", "antitrust", and "competition law".
- Supporting Online Intelligence: Searching for legal commentary on major UK competition damages cases, such as Sainsbury’s v Mastercard or BritNed v ABB, provides expert analysis from law firms on how UK courts approach the complex economic task of calculating antitrust damages. This helps us identify the key case names to search for.
- Expected Outcome: A foundational legal brief on the methodology for damages calculation that has been approved by UK courts. This is essential for correctly instructing our economic experts and ensuring that our damages model is built on a solid legal foundation that will be accepted by the court in our litigation.

65. Searchlink: `www-violationtracker-uk`

The Standard Model: Violation Tracker UK is a comprehensive database of regulatory infringements and penalties in the UK, with a powerful advanced search function that allows filtering by Offence Group (e.g., competition-related offences, consumer-protection-related offences) .
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To investigate the broader compliance record of the pharmaceutical companies involved in the pay-for-delay deals, looking for patterns of misconduct that go beyond competition law.
- Search Strategy: We will search Violation Tracker UK for the UK entities of all identified defendants, such as Lundbeck, Servier, and GSK. We will broaden the search beyond competition offences to include any “marketing and advertising offences,” “bribery and corruption” violations, or findings of “false claims/statements.”
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A search for “pharmaceutical company fined for illegal marketing UK” or “SFO GSK investigation” can reveal past enforcement actions by UK bodies like the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority (PMCPA) or the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), providing context for any findings.
- Expected Outcome: A comprehensive risk and compliance profile for each defendant company. A history of violations in other areas, such as illegal marketing or bribery, helps to build a compelling narrative of a corporate culture that is willing to break rules for profit. This narrative can be used strategically in the public relations campaign surrounding the case to frame the defendants as untrustworthy actors.

66. Searchlink: `www-business-property-courts-uk`

The Standard Model: The model for the archives of the UK’s specialist Business and Property Courts is to search for judgments in high-value, complex commercial disputes that may provide persuasive precedents .
Customisation for the PHARMA CASE:
- Objective: To find UK case law that deals with the complex calculation of damages and key economic defenses in large-scale competition law cases.
- Search Strategy: Our refined strategy is to search the archives of these courts for judgments that specifically discuss the methodology of “damages quantification,” “economic modeling,” and, crucially, the “pass-on defense” in the context of competition claims.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A search for legal commentary on “pass-on defence UK competition law” reveals numerous articles from law firms discussing how UK courts have treated this complex economic defense in landmark cases, such as the Sainsbury’s v Mastercard litigation.
- Expected Outcome: A legal brief detailing how UK courts handle the quantification of damages and the key economic defenses in competition cases. This intelligence is critical for preparing our own economic experts and for preemptively building legal and economic arguments to counter the defendants’ inevitable claims that the national health services did not suffer any actual loss.

42. Searchlink: `www-eur-lex`

The Standard Model: The EUR-Lex portal is the primary gateway to all forms of EU law ¹. Its advanced search function is vital for tracing the legislative and policy history of a specific rule ².
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To find the specific EU legal instrument that harmonizes the rules across the EU, enabling victims of anticompetitive practices to sue for damages.
- Search Strategy: Our refined strategy is to perform a targeted search on eur-lex.europa.eu to locate Directive 2014/104/EU, which is commonly known as the “Antitrust Damages Directive.” We will download the full, consolidated text of the Directive and search for any related official Communications or guidance from the Commission regarding its implementation by Member States.
- Supporting Online Intelligence: An online search for “EU Antitrust Damages Directive summary” confirms that this Directive is the central legal instrument designed to help citizens and companies claim damages if they are victims of infringements of EU antitrust law, such as cartels or abuses of dominant market positions. This makes it the foundational legal instrument for our entire case.
- Expected Outcome: A legal dossier containing the primary EU legislation that explicitly grants our clients (the national health services) the right to sue Teva and its partners for the damages caused by their illegal “pay-for-delay” behavior. This is a foundational legal document for the project.

43. Searchlink: `www-uks-business-and-property-courts`

The Standard Model: The model for using the archives of the UK’s specialist Business and Property Courts is to search for judgments in high-value, complex commercial disputes that may provide persuasive legal precedents ³.
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To find specific UK case law that deals with the complex economic arguments and defenses used in competition damages litigation.
- Search Strategy: Our refined strategy is to search the archives of these courts for judgments that specifically discuss the methodology of “damages quantification,” economic modeling, and, most importantly, the “pass-on defense.” The “pass-on defense” is the key argument defendants will use, claiming that the direct purchaser (the health service) suffered no actual loss because they simply passed the inflated costs on to the ultimate consumer (the taxpayer).
- Supporting Online Intelligence: Searching for legal commentary on “pass-on defence UK competition law” reveals numerous articles discussing how UK courts have treated this complex economic defense in landmark cases, such as the Sainsbury’s v Mastercard litigation.
- Expected Outcome: A detailed legal brief on how the UK courts handle the quantification of damages and, specifically, how they have dealt with the “pass-on defense.” This intelligence is critical for preparing our own economic experts and for preemptively building the legal and economic arguments needed to defeat this specific defense strategy.

44, 45 & 46. Searchlinks: `www-companieshouse-find-company-info` and its associated direct links

The Standard Model: The COCOO Doctrine for the Companies House advanced search is to use its precise filtering capabilities, particularly by SIC code, to identify and map all corporate players within a defined market segment ⁴.
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To create a comprehensive map of the entire UK generic pharmaceutical industry in order to identify all companies who could have entered the market with a generic version of the relevant drug, and were therefore potential parties to “pay-for-delay” agreements.
- Search Strategy: Our refined strategy is to use the advanced search functionality at find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk, combined with the SIC code resources. We will perform a comprehensive search for all active UK companies registered under the SIC code for “Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations” (2120).
- Supporting Online Intelligence: We will cross-reference the list generated from Companies House with the public membership directories of UK pharmaceutical trade associations, such as the British Generic Manufacturers Association (BGMA), to verify and enrich our data.
- Expected Outcome: A comprehensive map of the UK generic pharmaceutical industry. This list of all potential generic competitors is an invaluable intelligence asset. It allows us to analyze which companies did not enter the market upon a specific drug’s patent expiry. This raises the critical question of whether they were paid by the originator company to stay out, thus helping us to identify new targets for further investigation.

Our investigation will now conduct a more detailed search using the platform www-violationtracker-uk. The standard COCOO model for this tool is to build a comprehensive compliance history, or “rap sheet,” on corporate targets. For the Teva Case, our granular strategy is to conduct a thorough search for the UK subsidiaries of all the defendant pharmaceutical companies, including Teva and the relevant originator firms. We will broaden our search beyond just competition offences to include every available offence group, such as “marketing and advertising offences,” “health-care-related offenses,” and “bribery and corruption.” A supporting online search for enforcement actions by UK regulators like the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority (PMCPA) can provide important context for any findings. The objective is to build a multi-faceted risk profile, with the expected outcome being a detailed dossier on each defendant’s corporate culture and compliance history. This can be used to build a powerful negative narrative for the media campaign and to question their credibility as witnesses in court.

Next, we will perform a more granular search of the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) database, which is referenced by the searchlink www-cat. The established model for this platform is to find direct legal precedents. Our granular strategy for the Teva Case is to locate the complete case file for any existing UK “follow-on” damages claims concerning “pay-for-delay” deals, such as the known claim brought by the NHS against Servier regarding the drug Perindopril. Our plan is to download not just the final judgments, but all procedural rulings, directions given to economic experts, and scheduling orders. A supporting online search for “NHS Servier CAT case number” can help locate the specific case, such as No. 1282/5/7/18. The objective is to create a complete procedural and legal roadmap based on a directly parallel case, allowing us to anticipate every step of the litigation process, from filing to trial.

We will then conduct a deeper investigation of the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) website, www-cma-gov-uk. The doctrine for this source is to find market studies and, crucially, the primary evidence from regulatory decisions. Our granular strategy is to locate the original, full infringement decision by the CMA in a UK-specific “pay-for-delay” case, such as its investigation into the drug Paroxetine. We will navigate to the specific case page on the CMA’s online archive and download not just the final decision, but all supplementary public documents, such as the initial “Statement of Objections” and any published non-confidential responses from the companies involved. A supporting online search for “CMA Paroxetine decision” will locate this specific page. The objective is to gather the primary evidence and detailed legal reasoning from the UK regulator’s own investigation, providing the strongest possible foundation for a follow-on damages claim brought specifically in the UK courts.

At the EU level, we will conduct a similarly detailed search of the European Commission’s DG COMP website, www-dgcomp. The standard model is to search its archives for EU competition law precedents. Our granular strategy is to locate the official case page for the Commission’s investigation into Teva and Cephalon, which an online search confirms is Case AT.39686. The objective is to download every single public document associated with this specific case. This includes the initial press release announcing the investigation, the formal Statement of Objections sent to the parties, any summaries of public hearings, and the final, non-confidential version of the infringement decision itself. The expected outcome is a complete, official history of the specific infringement that our pan-European damages claim is based upon, providing the foundational evidence for the entire project.

Finally, we will use the legal database BAILII, found at www-bailii, for a highly targeted legal precedent search. The standard model is to search for UK case law. Our granular strategy is to find the judgments from the UK’s highest courts—the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court—that have reviewed the CMA’s “pay-for-delay” decisions on appeal. A supporting online search for “GSK Paroxetine Supreme Court judgment” will help us identify these key appellate decisions. The objective is to analyze the highest level of judicial interpretation of the legal and economic tests for “pay-for-delay” in the UK. This intelligence is essential for building a case that is not only successful at the first instance but is also legally robust enough to withstand the inevitable and costly appeals from the defendants.

Our investigation will now integrate the key internal file designated 64781. The standard COCOO doctrine treats such internal files as the core proprietary analysis that all external research is designed to validate. For the Teva Case, our granular strategy is to treat this file as our master economic model for calculating the “overcharge” paid by a national health service. This model would contain specific formulae for estimating the “but-for” price—that is, the price the generic drug would have reached if it had entered the market on time without any illegal delay. All our external research, using platforms like www-eurostat and government health reports, will now be designed to gather the specific data inputs required by this model. This includes historical pricing for the branded drug, market share data, and typical price erosion curves for generic drugs after a patent has expired, ensuring our damages claim is built on a robust and defensible foundation.

Next, using the EU’s Access to Markets portal, found at trade.ec.europa.eu, we will refine our strategy for gathering high-level policy arguments. The standard model for this platform is to analyze trade policy. For the Teva Case, our detailed strategy is to search for official EU policy documents related to its “Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe.” A supporting online search confirms this is a major published EU initiative. We will perform a detailed keyword search within these official strategy documents for phrases such as “access to affordable medicines,” “generic and biosimilar competition,” and “value for money.” The objective is to extract direct quotes from the European Commission that state that promoting timely generic competition is a core EU policy goal. This high-level policy evidence can then be used to frame Teva’s “pay-for-delay” actions as being directly contrary to the EU’s own stated strategic interests in public health.

To ensure absolute legal precision in our filings, we will use the EU vocabularies platform, showvoc.op.europa.eu. The standard model for this tool is to provide official definitions for EU terminology. For the Teva Case, our granular strategy is to use this platform to build a definitive glossary for our legal and economic teams. We will search for the official definitions of highly specific legal and economic terms used in competition law, including "relevant product market", "relevant geographic market", "substitutability", "patent settlement agreement", and "generic substitution rate". The objective is to ensure that all of our legal filings and expert economic reports use the precise, official terminology preferred by the European Commission and the European Courts. This adds rigor to our arguments and preempts any potential definitional challenges from the defendants’ legal teams.

We will then use Eurostat, the EU’s statistical office, which can be found via the www-eurostat searchlink, to quantify the economic context of the harm. The standard procedure is to extract large-scale datasets for analysis. Our granular strategy for the Teva Case is to gather statistics on public health expenditure and pharmaceutical consumption across the European Union. We will query the Eurostat database for tables on “government expenditure on health” and specifically on “pharmaceuticals and other medical goods.” We will also search for any available data on the volume of prescriptions for specific classes of drugs. The objective is to create a detailed, comparative presentation showing the immense scale of public spending on medicines in key countries like the UK, Germany, and France. This data powerfully illustrates the magnitude of the financial damage that even a small percentage overcharge on a single blockbuster drug can inflict upon national budgets and taxpayers.

Finally, we will use global patent databases, such as those found through the searchlink www-usp-wpi. The COCOO doctrine uses these platforms to investigate the intellectual property landscape. For the Teva Case, our granular strategy is to build a precise patent timeline for the specific drug at the heart of the “pay-for-delay” deal. We will search for the original patent for the blockbuster drug, for example Cephalon’s Modafinil, to find its exact expiry date. We will also search for any “secondary patents” filed by the originator company and, crucially, the patent applications filed by Teva for its generic version. An online search for a drug’s “Orange Book” entry in the US can provide these patent numbers. The objective is to create an evidence-based timeline that proves Teva was legally and technically ready to launch its generic product at the moment the illegal pay-for-delay agreement was struck, a critical element of our legal case.

Our investigation continues by targeting the public filings of the defendant companies in the US market, using the SEC EDGAR database, which is referenced by the searchlinks including www-sec-edgar and its direct search portals. The standard COCOO doctrine for this platform is to search the filings of US-listed companies to find financial data and, most importantly, crucial disclosures of material risks to their business. For the Teva Case, this is a primary intelligence source, as Teva Pharmaceutical Industries is a US-listed company. Our granular strategy involves several steps. First, we will use the legacy company search function to locate all of Teva’s historical filings. Second, we will download their most recent annual report, which for a foreign issuer is typically a Form 20-F. Third, we will conduct a detailed, full-text search within this document, focusing specifically on the “Legal Proceedings” and “Risk Factors” sections. Our search keywords will include "pay-for-delay", "antitrust", "European Commission", "patent settlement", and the names of any specific drugs involved in the infringement decisions. Supporting online searches for “Teva 10-K antitrust litigation summary” often lead to reports from financial news outlets or investment analysts who have already dissected these sections, which helps to guide our focus. The objective is to extract direct quotations from Teva’s own official disclosures to its investors where it acknowledges the nature and potential financial risks of these exact antitrust lawsuits. This is powerful, primary-source evidence for our claim.

Next, we will creatively adapt the use of the engineering and technical services search engine, GlobalSpec, found via the www-globalspec-com searchlink. The standard model for this platform is to identify technical specifications and specialist service providers. For the Teva Case, we will use it to support our economic damages analysis by identifying the industry-standard tools and experts in this niche field. Our detailed strategy is to use the platform to search for specialist consulting services in the fields of "pharmaceutical econometrics", "health economics modeling", and "drug pricing data analysis". The objective is to identify the leading expert firms and the specific commercial data sources, such as historical prescription data, that are considered the gold standard for modeling pharmaceutical markets. A supporting online search for the “top health economics consulting firms” reveals key global players like IQVIA, Clarivate, or the economic consulting practices of major firms. The expected outcome is a detailed intelligence report on the “state of the art” in pharmaceutical economic analysis. This is crucial for our project, as it allows us to identify and retain a world-class economic expert who can build our damages model using the same sophisticated techniques and data that the defendants’ own experts will undoubtedly use. This ensures that our calculation of the financial harm suffered by the public health services is robust enough to withstand intense scrutiny in court.

22. & 23. Searchlinks: `www-mayerbrown` and its associated direct link

The Standard Model: The COCOO-Mayer Brown Doctrine is a model for adversary intelligence, treating the public-facing thought leadership of a major law firm as a source for understanding how sophisticated legal opponents frame arguments and view legal risks in a specific sector ¹.
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To understand the legal arguments and pro-competitive justifications that pharmaceutical companies like Teva use to defend “pay-for-delay” patent settlements in court and before regulators.
- Search Strategy: We will search the publications sections of Mayer Brown and other elite law firms specializing in pharmaceutical antitrust law (such as Covington & Burling or Arnold & Porter). The search keywords will be "patent settlement", "reverse payment", "pharmaceutical antitrust", "pro-competitive justification", and the names of landmark cases like "FTC v. Actavis".
- Supporting Online Intelligence: An online search for “law firm analysis FTC v. Actavis” confirms that numerous top-tier firms have published detailed articles explaining the “rule of reason” legal test established by the US Supreme Court. This test allows companies to present evidence that their settlement had pro-competitive benefits, and understanding these arguments is key to defeating them.
- Expected Outcome: An intelligence report summarizing the common legal defenses used by pharmaceutical companies in these cases. This is critical “adversary intelligence” that will allow our legal team to prepare robust counter-arguments, anticipate the defendants’ entire legal strategy, and focus our economic analysis on disproving their specific justifications.

24. Searchlink: `www-companieshouse`

The Standard Model: The COCOO-Companies House Doctrine is a model for using the UK’s official company register for strategic sectoral analysis ². It emphasizes using the advanced search function, particularly filtering by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, to map an entire industry ³³³.
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To identify the precise UK corporate entities of both the originator and generic pharmaceutical companies involved in the pay-for-delay schemes that harmed the NHS.
- Search Strategy: We will use the Companies House advanced search portal to find the registered UK subsidiaries of the companies identified in the European Commission’s infringement decisions, such as Lundbeck, Servier, and Teva itself. For each confirmed entity, we will use its company registration number to download its full filing history, including annual accounts and confirmation statements identifying directors and Persons with Significant Control (PSCs).
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A quick check of the corporate websites for these parent companies often reveals a “global locations” or “contact us” page that lists the official name of their UK subsidiary (e.g., “Teva UK Limited”), which can then be used as a precise search term on Companies House.
- Expected Outcome: A detailed corporate dossier for each UK-based defendant. This dossier is a critical prerequisite for litigation and will include their registered address for serving legal documents, a list of their UK directors, and their UK financial accounts. The accounts can be analyzed to assess the scale of their UK business and their financial capacity.

25. Searchlink: `rns-oc-os`

The Standard Model: The COCOO-LSE Doctrine is a model for using the London Stock Exchange’s data for real-time market intelligence. The core is to monitor the Regulatory News Service (RNS) for “trigger events,” which then initiates a follow-up investigation using OpenCorporates (OC) and OpenSanctions (OS) ⁴.
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To monitor major UK-listed pharmaceutical companies for any public announcements related to new patent litigation, settlements with generic manufacturers, or antitrust investigations.
- Search Strategy: We will set up continuous monitoring alerts on the LSE News Explorer. The target companies will be UK-listed pharmaceutical giants like GSK and AstraZeneca. The alert keywords will be "patent", "litigation", "settlement", "generic", "antitrust", and "CMA".
- Supporting Online Intelligence: A search of financial news archives from sources like the Financial Times or Reuters for phrases like “GSK patent settlement” can reveal the typical language and timing of such announcements, helping to refine our monitoring keywords.
- Expected Outcome: An early-warning system for potential new “pay-for-delay” cases. An RNS announcement disclosing a new patent litigation settlement with a generic company would be a major “trigger event.” The OC-OS protocol would be immediately activated to perform a full corporate and due diligence check on the generic company involved, potentially identifying a new case for future action.

26. Searchlink: `www-sede-registradores-org`

The Standard Model: The doctrine for the Spanish Registries is to use the portal to access official data on Spanish companies, including details on legal representatives, directors, and financial accounts ⁵.
Customisation for the TEVA CASE:
- Objective: To identify the official Spanish legal entities of the pharmaceutical companies involved, as Spain’s national health service is a key victim.
- Search Strategy: We will use the sede.registradores.org portal to search for the Spanish subsidiaries (typically an “S.A.” or “S.L.”) of the parent companies like Lundbeck, Servier, and Teva. For each entity we find, we will request a Nota Simple to verify their registered details, confirm their corporate purpose (objeto social), and identify their current administradores (directors).
- Supporting Online Intelligence: The website of the Spanish Agency of Medicines and Medical Devices (AEMPS) often lists the official names of the marketing authorization holders for specific drugs in Spain. This can be used to confirm we have identified the correct legal entity that sold the drug in the Spanish market.
- Expected Outcome: A verified list of the correct Spanish corporate defendants. This intelligence is essential for correctly filing the Spanish part of the pan-European damages claim and for understanding the corporate structure within one of the largest affected markets.

Our investigation will now apply the conceptual framework associated with www-stealthconsolidation. The standard COCOO model for this resource is to identify how a series of small, individually insignificant corporate acquisitions can accumulate to significantly reduce competition in a market. For the Teva Case, we will customize this model to investigate the corporate history of both Teva and the originator company it partnered with. Our detailed strategy is to analyze Teva’s own growth through acquisition, such as its major purchase of Cephalon, a company that was itself implicated in pay-for-delay deals. We will also investigate the originator company for any patterns of acquiring smaller biotech firms whose pipeline products could have one day competed with the blockbuster drug in question. A supporting online search for academic studies on “killer acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry” provides the theoretical framework for this analysis. The objective is to build a detailed narrative for the competition authorities, arguing that the specific “pay-for-delay” deal was not an isolated incident but was part of a broader corporate strategy to methodically suppress competition from all possible sources.

Next, as a crucial foundational step, we will use the tool referenced by nac-sic-gpt. The standard model for this tool is to obtain precise industry classification codes to ensure the accuracy of all subsequent database searches. Our granular strategy for the Teva Case is to get the definitive NACE codes for the entire pharmaceutical value chain. This will include not just “Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations” (code 21.20) for the finished drugs made by Teva and the originator, but also “Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products” (code 21.10) for the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), and “Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods” (code 46.46) for the distributors. The objective is to achieve maximum precision. Having these distinct codes will allow us to analyze each part of the value chain separately when we query databases like Eurostat or procurement portals, enabling us to build a complete and highly detailed economic picture of the affected market.

We will then turn to the Global Trade Alert platform, found at www-globaltradealert-org and its associated data center. The standard model for this platform is to identify state-level trade policy measures. For the Teva Case, our strategy is to search the database for any trade interventions or disputes related to the international trade of generic medicines and their active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs). We will filter our searches by implementing countries that are major API producers, such as India and China, and by affected jurisdictions like the EU and the US. A supporting online search for “EU API import regulations from India” can provide context on the existing trade dynamics. The objective is to find any data on trade measures that affect the cost or availability of the inputs for generic drugs. This provides a broader context for our case, showing how “pay-for-delay” deals can worsen existing vulnerabilities in the global pharmaceutical supply chain, a point that strengthens the public interest dimension of our claim.

Finally for this batch, we address the internal COCOO files, referenced by the direct_file links. The COCOO doctrine treats these internal files as the core project proposal that all external intelligence gathering is designed to support. For the Teva Case, this is the “Proyecto de Contratación Pública” to manage the collective action. Our granular strategy is to ensure that every single piece of external intelligence we gather is explicitly mapped to a specific section of this internal proposal document. For example, the definitive list of corporate defendants we identify using OpenCorporates will directly populate Annex A, titled “The Defendants.” The detailed economic data on market size and overcharges from Eurostat and government reports will populate Section C, “Quantification of Harm.” The key legal infringement decisions from EUR-Lex will form the entirety of Section B, “Legal Basis for Action.” The objective of this process is to systematically use our intelligence work to transform the internal proposal from a concept into a fully-evidenced, actionable, and undeniable plan.

Our investigation continues by using the global corporate registry aggregator, OpenCorporates, referenced by the searchlinks including www-opencorporates-com. The standard COCOO model for this platform is to use its extensive database to map complex, cross-jurisdictional corporate structures. For the Teva Case, this is a fundamental legal prerequisite. Our strategy is to use OpenCorporates to identify the precise European legal entities for both Teva Pharmaceutical Industries and the originator company it partnered with in the “pay-for-delay” scheme. We will map their network of national subsidiaries in all key European jurisdictions, such as the UK, Germany, France, and Spain. Supporting online searches for news articles or court filings from the original European Commission investigation will help us confirm the names of the specific legal entities that were formally party to the infringement. The objective is to compile a definitive and accurate list of the correct corporate defendants for our multi-jurisdictional lawsuit.

Immediately following this, we will use the OpenSanctions platform, accessible via the os and www-opensanctions-org/advancedsearch searchlinks, to conduct due diligence. The standard model for this tool is to screen individuals and companies against global sanctions and Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) lists. Our strategy for the Teva Case is to conduct a thorough due diligence check on the defendant companies, Teva and the originator, as well as their senior executives and board members. We will run the names of these companies and their leaders through the OpenSanctions database. While it is unlikely that these specific companies will be on sanctions lists, supporting online searches for phrases like “pharmaceutical company OFAC fines” can reveal past penalties for breaching sanctions programs against specific countries. The objective is to produce a full compliance and risk profile for each defendant. Any findings of past misconduct, even if unrelated to competition law, can be used to build a negative character narrative for our media campaign, questioning their corporate integrity.

Our investigation continues by using the platform www-db-comp-eu, an independent aggregator of EU competition cases. The standard COCOO model for this tool is to use it for rapid precedent analysis. For the Teva Case, this is a primary intelligence source. Our strategy is to use its search functions to find all EU antitrust cases that involve Teva Pharmaceutical Industries or companies it has acquired, such as Cephalon. We will use keywords including “pay for delay,” “Teva,” “Cephalon,” and the relevant NACE code for pharmaceutical manufacturing. The objective is to compile a complete list of every instance where Teva has been investigated for anti-competitive practices in Europe. This dossier is essential for building a comprehensive profile of the defendant and for understanding the full scope of the European Commission’s enforcement actions against them.

Next, we will use the EU’s trade policy portal, referenced by the searchlink www-policy-trade-ec-europa-eu, to gather high-level policy arguments. The standard model for this platform is to search for official policy documents. Our strategy is to search the portal for all documents related to the “Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe.” A supporting online search confirms that this is a major, published EU initiative. The objective is to find official policy statements that emphasize the EU’s strategic goals for ensuring the affordability and accessibility of medicines. This provides a powerful high-level argument that “pay-for-delay” deals, by keeping drug prices artificially high, run directly contrary to the stated public health objectives of the European Union itself.

We will then use the platform www-eu-itas-by-nation and its associated EU statistical databases for contextual economic data. The standard model is to extract quantitative data on trade. Since our case involves products, not services, our strategy is to pivot to the linked Comext database to find data on the total value of pharmaceutical products imported into the EU from major generic drug manufacturing hubs, such as India and Israel. The objective is to show the immense scale and economic importance of the generic import market. This data can be used to demonstrate the significant harm caused when “pay-for-delay” deals illegally block the entry of these more affordable medicines.

The EU’s trade enforcement portal, found at www-policy-trade-ec-europa-eu-2, will be used for a more creative, secondary line of inquiry. The standard model is to use this platform to challenge trade barriers. Our strategy is to search the database for any past complaints where a country’s patent enforcement system has been challenged as being a barrier to trade. The objective is to see if intellectual property rights have been successfully framed as a trade issue in other contexts. This could provide novel legal arguments for our case about how patent settlement agreements can be viewed as an illegal blockage of trade in generic medicines between countries.

Finally, for this batch, we will use the UK announcements platform Investegate, www-investegate. The standard model for this tool is to monitor the public statements of UK-listed companies. While Teva is not listed in the UK, major British pharmaceutical companies like GSK and AstraZeneca are. Our strategy is to monitor their announcements for any disclosures related to patent litigation settlements with generic companies. Our search keywords will include "patent", "litigation", "settlement", and "generic". The objective is to use this as an early-warning system to identify potential new “pay-for-delay” deals in the UK market that may warrant future investigation and legal action.

Batch 1 of 28

Our investigation for the Teva Case begins by using the UK public sector directory referenced by the searchlink www-publicsector-co-uk. The standard COCOO model for this platform is to identify key officials within the UK public sector to find the right contacts for engagement. For this case, our strategy is to customize this model to pinpoint the specific budget holders and procurement managers within the National Health Service (NHS) who are responsible for pharmaceutical spending. Supporting online searches for the structure of the “NHS Commercial Medicines Directorate” can help identify the key decision-making bodies. The objective is to build a detailed map of the public entities and individuals in the UK who were financially harmed by Teva’s anti-competitive agreements. These officials are our primary potential clients and lead claimants for a UK-based collective action to recover the overcharges.

Next, we will use the advanced search capabilities of the UK government’s main website, www-gov-uk-search-advanced. The established model for this platform is to locate official government reports and data. Our strategy is to perform a detailed search for any reports published by the National Audit Office (NAO) or the Department of Health and Social Care that relate to spending on the specific drugs involved in Teva’s “pay-for-delay” deals. Our search will use a combination of keywords such as "NHS medicine costs", "generic drug competition", "Teva", and the name of the specific originator drug. The objective is to find official UK government data that helps to quantify the financial harm caused by the delayed entry of Teva’s generic product, which will be core evidence for our damages calculation.

To identify the corporate defendants across Europe, we will use the EU e-Justice portal, referenced by the searchlinks www-e-justice-europa-eu-advancedsearch and its business register search function. The standard model for this platform is to use the interconnection of national business registries to find official corporate information on any EU-based company. For the Teva Case, our strategy is to use the portal’s business register search to find all registered European legal entities for Teva Pharmaceutical Industries and for the originator company with whom they made the illegal agreement. The objective is to map their complete European corporate footprint. This is a critical legal step to ensure we correctly identify all the liable defendants in any pan-European legal action.

Finally, we will use the European Commission’s competition case database, found at www-competition-cases-ec-europa-eu-searchcaseinstrumentsa. The COCOO doctrine uses this platform to find competition law precedents and infringement decisions. This is a primary and fundamental tool for our case. The strategy is to conduct an exhaustive search for the specific “pay-for-delay” antitrust case that implicates Teva. An online search will help us confirm the relevant case number, for example, the case concerning agreements between Cephalon (which Teva later acquired) and Teva. The objective is to locate and download the full, official infringement decision from the European Commission. This document is the legal foundation for our entire “follow-on” damages claim, as it contains the definitive finding of illegality upon which our action to recover damages is based.

File 1: CaseLink Model for COCOO_.txt

File 2: HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt

File 3: TI_ BORs.pdf (Transparency International on Beneficial Ownership Registers)

File 4: MA DISCLOSURES.pdf (A New Era of Midnight Mergers)

File 5: Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf.coredownload.pdf (FATF Guidance)

92. Searchlink: www-pacer-usa

93. Searchlink: www-usaspending-gov

94. Searchlink: www-global-branddb-wipo-int

95. Searchlink: www-register-openownership-org-search

96. Searchlink: www-infocif-es

87. Searchlink: www-uk-parlm-petitions

88. Searchlink: www-usa-oge-gov

89. Searchlink: www-usa-congress-lobby-discl

90. & 91. Searchlinks: www-espacenet-global-patents and www-ppubs-uspto-patents

82, 83, 84 & 85. Searchlinks: www-bidstats-uk, www-oscartool-gov-uk, and their associated links

86. Searchlink: www-wto-disp-settlement

77. Searchlink: www.ajbell.co.uk/markets/investment-trusts

78. Searchlink: www-contractsfinder-gov-uk

79. Searchlink: www-ec-presscorner

80. Searchlink: www-gov-uk-government-organisations

81. Searchlink: www-lse-shareholder-identification

72. Searchlink: ec-commissioners-discl

73. Searchlink: www-ec-europa-eu-consumers-odr

74. Searchlink: www-eu-fundstenders

75. Searchlink: e-justice.europa.eu/advancedSearchManagement

76. Searchlink: www.ajbell.co.uk/market-research/screener/shares

67. Searchlink: www-casetracker-gov-uk

68. Searchlink: www.hl.co.uk/funds

69. Searchlink: www-causelist-gov-uk

70. Searchlink: www-find-tender-service-gov-uk

71. Searchlink: www-lobbyfacts-eu

62. Searchlink: 64816 (Internal Document)

63. Searchlink: www-ec-europa-eu-haveyoursay

64. Searchlink: www-caselaw-nationalarchives-gov-uk

65. Searchlink: www-violationtracker-uk

66. Searchlink: www-business-property-courts-uk

42. Searchlink: www-eur-lex

43. Searchlink: www-uks-business-and-property-courts

44, 45 & 46. Searchlinks: www-companieshouse-find-company-info and its associated direct links

22. & 23. Searchlinks: www-mayerbrown and its associated direct link

24. Searchlink: www-companieshouse

25. Searchlink: rns-oc-os

26. Searchlink: www-sede-registradores-org